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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the public sector wage premium in the UK over the last decade using 
both econometric and economic modelling methods. A comprehensive literature review is con-
ducted to summarise the four popular types of methods adopted by the existing microecono-
metric studies, which are weakly derived from some labour economic theories. A common 
problem of the econometric methods is the difficulty in dealing with selection bias when valid 
instruments are not available. All four types of econometric methods are then applied to esti-
mating the public sector wage premium, resulting in an overall average of 6.5% with a rela-
tively higher female’s premium. In particular, propensity score matching method provides the 
most robust estimate against mis-specification. As a bridge between microdata and macrodata 
in the labour market, the wage premium is shown to be counter-cyclical. 
Indirect inference is then introduced as a new method of testing and estimating a microfounded 
economic model in the microdata analysis context. All four types of econometric methods are 
used as auxiliary models to summarise the data features, based on which the distance between 
the actual data and the model-simulated data is assessed. A calibrated model passes the test 
only when the propensity score matching method is used as the comparison criterion. To focus 
on the key properties of the model, the OLS coefficients are grouped into a smaller dimension, 
and the estimated model can also pass the test. The selection bias can be tested in a straightfor-
ward way under indirect inference, and we find no evidence for selection bias in the data. A 
Monte Carlo experiment is designed to verify the high statistical power of indirect inference 
test. Finally, a normative analysis is carried out and we do not find unjust factors behind the 
observed public sector wage premium. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
There has been a long discussion in many countries, including the UK, whether the public 
sector workers are paid too much. This is both an important economic issue and a political 
issue, concerned with both efficiency and equity. The first step to deal with these issues is 
therefore to estimate the public sector wage premium using a robust method, on which the 
empirical literature has never come to a consensus. Almost all the prevailing methods, no mat-
ter how complicated the techniques are, belong to the paradigm of econometric models. If 
individual-level microdata are involved, they are also called microeconometric models. It is 
ironic that very few attempts have been made to address microeconomic issues as such by 
microfounded economic models.  
The main reason for the preference of empirical econometric models over theoretical economic 
models is obvious—simplicity. It is very easy and straightforward to build an econometric 
model such as a linear regression without much technical costs nowadays, especially after sta-
tistical software such as STATA and EVIEWS are developed. The econometric models mainly 
follow a philosophy of “let data speak” given its weak link between these econometric models 
with economic theories. A common practice is that researchers start with some economic the-
ory (and maybe even a formal economic model) and derive some relationships, which are then 
loosely translated into some testable hypotheses. Subsequently, instead of the economic model 
per se, the econometric model (usually a regression model) embedding these testable hypoth-
eses is then confronted against the data. Obviously, there are two gaps between econometric 
models and economic models. On the one hand, such a simplified econometric model is only 
a subset of the original economic model, because it only test/estimate one or several hypotheses 
of it, not the whole. On the other hand, the linearity (or log linearity) of the regression model 
greatly reduces the accuracy of the predictions of a highly nonlinear economic model. With 
these said, there is a considerable risk that what you test/estimate by an econometric model is 
not what an economic model actually implies. The validity of the findings of econometric mod-
els is also under question. 
In retrospect of the history of economic thoughts, there has been a methodological separation 
between microeconomics and macroeconomics from 1930s (the “Keynesian revolution”) to 
1970s (the “New Classical revolution”). During those four decades, most empirical macroeco-
nomic models were built on ad hoc relationships among aggregate variables—just like empir-
ical microeconomic models nowadays are built on ad hoc relationships among individual var-
iables. Nevertheless, from 1980s onwards, especially after the real business cycle (RBC) para-
digm is introduced by Prescott and Kydland (1982) into macroeconomics, the theoretical mod-
elling methods of microeconomics and macroeconomics converge more or less in the same 
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direction—the mainstream macroeconomic models are microfounded. However, this conver-
gence has not been synchronised in the empirical realm—the mainstream methods adopted by 
empirical microeconomic research are still regressions or its variants. In contrast, the methods 
and techniques in the empirical macroeconomic research has greatly advanced in the latest 
decade, allowing for a tight connection between theory and empirics. A very complicated mi-
crofounded economic model with high nonlinearity can be solved, tested and estimated without 
having to introduce an ad hoc gap between theoretical models and empirical models. 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore both empirical and methodological. On the one hand, it 
aims to provide a robust estimate of the public sector wage premium in the UK during the first 
decade in the 21st century (positive analysis) and to answer whether this premium is fair and 
justified (normative analysis). On the other hand, a critical review of existing econometric 
modelling methods and techniques is also conducted, while a new method (indirect inference) 
adapted from the frontier macroeconomic literature is developed to estimating the wage pre-
mium and to test the selection bias. This thesis attempts to combine the methods in different 
sub-disciplines of economics, with a hope to enhance the communication between microeco-
nomic and macroeconomic research in terms of both methodology and techniques. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. CHAPTER I is devoted to a comprehensive literature 
review, summarising the empirical findings of the public sector wage premium and comparing 
different microeconometric methods (based on econometric models) with the indirect inference 
method (based on economic models). CHAPTER II describes the data and identifies some styl-
ised facts of the wage premium and working hours in the UK. CHAPTER III focuses on the 
econometric modelling and microeconometric methods, while CHAPTER IV focuses on the 
economic modelling and indirect inference method. Towards the end of CHAPTER III, the 
correlation between the public sector wage premium and the macroeconomic business cycle is 
discussed to bridge the microdata and microdata in the labour market. And the last section of 
CHAPTER IV answers the key question: is the public sector wage premium fair? 
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CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the UK, 50% of government spending goes to wages, and the public sector employs about 
20% of the total UK workforce (Chatterji et al, 2010). The public sector is the largest employer 
in the UK, and has an influential impact on the economy. Therefore, the efficiency and equity 
of the public sector pay system are of great interest to both theorists and practitioners. In par-
ticular, the recent financial crisis and the great recession revived the debate over the need to 
restructure the public sector, and the wage premium in public sector lies at the centre of this 
debate in the mass media (e.g. BBC, 09 May 2011; 10 Mar 2014; 05 Feb 2016; 28 Mar 2016). 
According to the neoclassical paradigm, any pay differential in competitive markets must re-
flect differences in worker characteristics or job attributes. After controlling for these factors, 
a systematic wage premium or penalty in the public sector should not exist. However, in prac-
tice, pay differential across sectors exists almost in all economies and across all periods, even 
after controlling for these factors. Disney (2007) summarises that this wage premium results 
from different occupational composition, pay structure, unionised wage setting power and 
worker preferences. 
The first aim of this thesis is to provide a robust estimate of the public sector wage premium 
(PSWP) in the UK. To answer this question is not simple, because there are various dimensions 
causing the wage differentials, such as time, geographic area, gender, age, education, occupa-
tion, etc. Moreover, selection bias problem may exist if the choice of working in public sector 
is not exogenous—there may be omitted variables that affect both a worker’s sector choice and 
her wage. In other words, if the individuals working in the two sectors are not randomly sam-
pled, then OLS estimates are misleading because we are not comparing like with like. Simple 
regression ignores the fact that the sector in which an individual is working, unlike race and 
gender, depends on decisions made by rational economic agents. Neglecting this selectivity 
effect will lead to a wrong picture of the relative earnings position of the public sector workers. 
1 The Public Sector Wage Premium Puzzle 
The public-private pay differential has been a central issue in labour economics and policy 
making since at least Smith (1976). Pay comparability between public and private sectors is 
important for both efficiency and equity issues in the public policy. Regarding efficiency, gov-
ernment needs to know whether it pays an adequate wage to attract the right workers and to 
motivate the right efforts. For equity, the individual workers in both private and public sectors 
want to know if they are equally paid, and a fair pay scheme will promote a more competitive 
labour market across sectors. However, a vast literature across countries and over time shows 
that there are systematic pay differentials between private and public sectors, especially in the 
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developed countries such as the US, Canada and the UK. This section provides a comprehen-
sive review on the most influential articles in PSWP, and the key literature is summarised in 
Table 1 (NB: The types of method will be explained in the rest of this paper). 
Literature Data Country Period Method 
Smith (1976) US Census US 1960s-1970s Type 2 
Gunderson (1979) Canadian Census Canada 1971 Type 2 
Robinson and Tomes (1984) 
Social Change in Canada 
Survey 
Canada 1979 Type 4 
Venti (1987) Current Population Survey US 1982 Type 2, 4 
Poterba and Rueben (1994) 
Employer Cost Index;  
Current Population Survey 
US 1979-1992 Type 1, 2 
Disney and Gosling (1998) 
General Household Survey 
& British Household Panel 
Survey 
UK 1980s-1990s Type 1, 2 
Blackaby et al (1999) Labour Force Survey UK 1993-1995 Type 1, 2 
Melly (2005) Current Population Survey US 1973-1989 Type 1, 2 
Ramoni-Perazzi and Bellante (2006) Current Population Survey US 1992-2000 Type 3, 4 
Gibson (2009) 
International Social Survey 
Program Work Orientations 
Survey 
New 
Zealand 
2005 Type 3 
Chatterji et al (2010) 
British Workplace; Em-
ployee Relations Survey 
UK 2004 Type 1, 2 
Voinea and Mihaescu (2011) Household Budget Survey Romania 2004-2009 Type 1, 2 
Blackaby et al (2012) Labour Force Survey UK 1994-2011 Type 2 
Maczulskij (2013) Labour Force Survey Finland 1977-2008 Type 1, 4 
Afonso and Gomes (2014) Macrodata OECD 1973-2000 Type 1, 4 
Anton et al (2015) Wage Structure Survey Spain 2010 Type 2 
Morikawa (2016) Employment Status Survey Japan 2007 Type 1, 2 
Table 1 Summary of the Key Literature on PSWP 
It is noted that, during 1960s and 1970s, the federal pay systems in the US were reformed to 
achieve the purpose of narrowing pay differentials from comparable works in the public and 
private sectors. The seminal paper of Smith (1976) marks a milestone in the literature, and the 
empirical results indicate that the federal workers were consistently paid more than their coun-
terparts in the private sector in the US. One of the influential contributions of this paper is that 
the observed pay differential is decomposed into two parts. One is due to the differences in 
personal characteristics between the workers in the two sectors and the other is due to the eco-
nomic rent (justified or not) in the public sector. Gunderson (1979) applies the same method-
ology to Canadian census, with a particular focus on the wage premium in terms of gender and 
income distribution. Evidence shows that females enjoy a higher wage premium of working in 
the public sector than males. Moreover, the public sector pay advantage is found larger for low-
wage workers, resulting in the basic policy dilemma that reducing the PSWP may conflict with 
the goal of raising low-wage workers. 
In the 1980s, Carow (1981), Bellante and Long (1981) and Quinn (1982) challenged the valid-
ity of this decomposition noting that “we can never fully capture all worker-specific differences” 
(Venti, 1987). In other words, the unexplained component of pay differential between public 
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and private sectors may be more properly interpreted as unobserved individual differences and 
job attributes. For example, on the labour demand side, the unobservable factors may include 
the nonpecuniary job attributes or “fringe benefits”, such as stability of employment, oppor-
tunity for internal promotion, unique nature of public service, pace of work, the bureaucratic 
work environment, and so on. On the labour supply side, people with different tastes may prefer 
to work in one sector to the other because of these nonpecuniary aspects, and the sector choice 
may reflect the fundamental differences in people’s perception of the two types of job. 
Following this argument, Venti (1987) finds that wage equality between similar workers in the 
public and private sectors was not achieved in the US. After adjusting for both observed and 
unobserved individual characteristics, the basic conclusions in previous studies are actually 
strengthened. Females working in the public sector earn 22% higher than their counterparts in 
the private sector, while males earn 4% higher than those in the private sector. It is argued that, 
if nonpecuniary benefits are ignored, the PSWP is likely to be underestimated. Venti (1987) 
also formulates and estimates a model permitting prediction of the pay differential that elimi-
nates implicit queues for public sector jobs, noting that labour market in the two sectors does 
not always clear. The estimates suggest that “elimination of queues would be achieved by re-
ducing the federal wages for males about 16% and for females by about 42%”. The reduction 
in the public sector wages implied by the estimates is substantial, indicating a huge potential 
for efficiency improvement in the public sector. 
Meanwhile, there is an alternative focus in the literature to investigate the impacts of union 
status on the wage premium in public sector. This strand of literature has brought awareness of 
selection bias problem and multiple-equation models into this field. The effect of unions on 
wage is introduced by Lewis (1963) and Freeman and Medoff (1981) for the US, and Parsley 
(1980) for the UK. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972) and Schmidt (1978) show that the positive 
effect of unions on wage estimated in single-equation model can be eliminated in a simultane-
ous equations framework. Lee (1978) proposes an explicit model of endogenous choice on 
union status, which is then used to correct for selection bias. This idea is actually very similar 
to Heckman selection model (1979). Robinson and Tomes (1984) is the first study that allows 
for the determination of union status in estimating PSWP. It is found that the choice of union 
status is strongly affected by the expected wage gain from joining the unionised sector, and 
evidence suggests a larger union gains in the public sector than in the private sector. Therefore, 
a major reason for the PSWP is attributed to the stronger public sector unions.  
Following a series of papers in the early 1990s, such as Chamberlain (1994) and Buchinsky 
(1994), quantile regression emerges as a popular technique to parsimoniously model the con-
ditional wage distribution. This technique was immediately adopted in the studies of PSWP by 
Poterba and Rueben (1994), who find that the relative wages of women employed in the two 
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sectors changed very little during 1979-1992 in the US, while the relative wages of men rose 
nearly 8%. This paper also explores the distribution of wage premium in terms of education 
level. Evidence shows that the advantage for highly educated workers to work in the public 
sector disappeared in the 1980s, while those with at most a high school education still enjoy a 
significant wage premium. Another important conclusion from quantile regression is that the 
magnitude of wage premium is sensitive to the choice of quantile, but the change in the wage 
premium is not substantially affected. 
 
Figure 1 Public Sector Wage Premium by Gender (Disney and Gosling, 1998) 
Disney and Gosling (1998) apply quantile regression technique to the UK data, and find a clear 
evidence of a downward trend in the PSWP over the 1980s and 1990s, as quoted in Figure 1. 
It is reported that wage premium for women is again persistently higher and more significant 
than that for men during this period. The wage premium has virtually disappeared for males by 
the mid-1990s. Moreover, the higher-paid workers in the public sector have a different wage 
premium than lower-paid workers, implying a different return to education across sectors. At 
the same time, Mueller (1998) uses the same technique to study the PSWP in Canada, as an 
extension to the previous work (Gunderson, 1979). Similar conclusions emerge—females and 
individuals at the lower tail of the wage distribution have higher wage premium. Following 
earlier literature in Canada, Mueller (1998) also takes into account the role of the public sector 
unions, which tend to have higher bargaining power than the private sector unions. Hence, it is 
a comprehensive combination of previous studies in this area. Despite the recognition of the 
importance of the distributional properties, these studies ignore the unobserved (residual) fac-
tors between workers and jobs. Seeing that, Blackaby et al (1999) combine quantile regression 
with the decomposition method proposed by Juhn et al (1993) to capture the distribution of 
unobserved factors. Their findings are entirely consistent with the stylised facts in the US noted 
by Poterba and Rueben (1994) and Mueller (1998).  
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Entering the 21st century, the PSWP is less significant, but the wage premium for females is 
still consistently higher than males. Latest literature places a special focus on the gender dif-
ference and regional difference. Chatterji et al (2010) find that the gap for male employees is 
less than half that for females in the UK. The major component of the earnings gap between 
men and women in the UK is associated with the gender effect, which suggests that the Equal 
Pay legislation has not been fully effective in either sector. As shown in Blackaby et al (2012), 
the earnings gap is significantly negative for men working in London and South East in the UK 
(see Figure 2), ranging from -16% (2000-2002) to -10% (2008-2010). In addition to region and 
gender, they also investigate the PSWP in terms of firm size, education level and specification 
of the earnings equation, providing a comprehensive investigation. 
 
Figure 2 Public Sector Wage Premium by Gender (Blackaby et al, 2012) 
Allington and Morgan (2003) conduct a literature review on the UK-based studies, not only on 
microeconometric studies, but also on macroeconometric studies using aggregated data on 
PSWP such as Trinder (1981), Elliot and Murphy (1987), Elliott and Duffus (1996), and Nick-
ell and Quintini (2002). One of the advantages of using macrodata is that a longer sample period 
is available ready for time-serious analysis. However, the underlying demographic character-
istics may change over time and must be taken into account. Macrodata evidence also suggests 
that the benefits of working in public sector were greater for females and manual workers in 
the 1970s and 1980s, while the premiums have gradually become penalties by the end of the 
1990s, especially for males and highly skilled workers. 
Different from a commonly observed public sector wage premium in the developed countries, 
the literature on developing countries, however, is less conclusive. For some transitional econ-
omies, the PSWP is found to be negative, such as Corbo and Stelcner (1983) for Chili, Adam-
chik and Bedi (2000) for Poland, Leping (2005) for Estonia, and Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) 
for Russia. In contrast, countries like Tanzania (Lindauer and Sabot, 1983), Côte d’Ivoire 
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(Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988), Haiti (Terrell, 1993) and China (Yu and Chen, 2010, Yin and 
Gan, 2009) have similar features of PSWP observed in developed countries, including the dis-
tributional heterogeneity in gender and education level. 
To summarise, a positive PSWP is observed from 1960s to mid-1990s on both sides of Atlantic, 
especially for females and low skilled/educated workers than their counterparts working in the 
private sectors. However, the overall wage premium has diminished since the late-1990s, sug-
gesting a more competitive labour market across sectors. In particular, males in the public sec-
tor are more likely to have wage penalties, while females still enjoy a positive wage premium 
of working in the public sector.  
There are four main reasons for the wage premium identified by the literature. First, private 
firms are profit maximisers, while public sector employers are more like vote maximisers. 
There is usually a wage floor for public sector wage to compete with private employers for 
workforce, so the disadvantaged group (e.g. females, low skilled workers) tends to benefit more 
from this protection. In contrast, the disadvantaged workers in private sector do not face such 
protection because profit is private firms’ foremost objective, and the advantaged workers (e.g. 
males, highly skilled workers) are able to (and more motivated to) create more fortune in pri-
vate sector than in public sector. Second, unions are usually more pervasive and have stronger 
bargaining power in the public sector, imposing a greater pressure on wage, especially for dis-
advantaged workers. Third, the demand for public sector services is usually regarded as inelas-
tic, so the demand for labour in public sector is also inelastic. As such, a positive wage premium 
is possible and will be passed on to the customers, i.e. taxpayers. Finally, the magnitude of 
wage premium also depends on the phase of business cycles. Private sector wages are more 
sensitive to economic fluctuations, while public sector wages are less cyclical or even counter-
cyclical. 
2 The Selection Bias 
To understand the evolution of the literature of PSWP, it is crucial to know the role of the 
selection bias problem in the empirical literature. It is actually a fundamental issue for applied 
microeconomics. Hence, this section will discuss the causes, consequences and solutions to 
this important issue before summarising various methods applied in the existing literature and 
proposing a new method in this paper. 
2.1 Selection Bias VS. Endogeneity Bias 
To start with, it is very easy to confuse between the bias due to selection and that due to en-
dogeneity. These two are very distinct concepts, both of which have different solutions.  
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The selection bias refers to scenarios where the dependent variable is observed only for a non-
random sample, e.g. an individual’s wage within the public sector is observed only if she is 
working in the public sector, and vice versa. In contrast, the endogeneity bias means that an 
independent variable included in the model is an endogenous variable, correlated with unob-
servable factors in the error term. The dependent variable, however, is observed for all sample 
in the data. In the context of PSWP, those who choose to work in the public sector may have 
some special characteristics such as stronger risk aversion, so they would have earned less if 
they are working in the private sector where taking risks is necessary. By nature, the selection 
bias is a data problem (non-random sample), while the endogeneity bias is a model problem 
(omitted variable).  
2.2 Causes and Consequences of Selection Bias 
In general, the selection bias problem may be caused by three reasons. The first is “self-selec-
tion bias”, which refers to the situation where individuals have some unobserved/latent char-
acteristics affecting the probability of being sampled. In the context of PSWP, researchers may 
run regression directly on all the observable individual characteristics and job attributes (in-
cluding the sector choice). However, the choice of working in public sector is not like race or 
gender, which are determined by nature and cannot be chosen. In contrast, people have freedom 
to choose in which sector they work. That is to say, the observed individuals working in public 
sector may not be randomly sampled from population. There is an unobserved tendency or 
propensity leading them to choose which sector to work in, and this latent factor must take 
different values for different individuals. Following Heckman, this unobserved factor can be 
regarded as the omitted variable. As discussed later, the self-selection bias problem can be 
interpreted as endogeneity bias problem. 
The second reason is the non-randomness due to the decisions taken by data analysts, which is 
also identified by Heckman (1979). Different from the first type which is caused by the ob-
served, this type of selection bias is caused by the observer. It is common in empirical research 
that the researcher may drop some observations on purpose. Qualitative studies relying on 
small samples, collected by approaches such as questionnaires and interviews, are usually sub-
ject to this type of selection bias. This sort of problem can be avoided if the researcher is better 
informed about the data structure, so that stratification could be used in sampling to mitigate 
this risk. 
The third reason for selection bias is due to the observability or tractability of some part of the 
population. The difference from the other two causes is that it is the nature of the data, rather 
than the action of the analyst, that leads to the omission of some data points. This type of 
selection bias often occurs when there is a threshold for individuals to be observed. For exam-
ple, to estimate the return on education, the sample can only encompass those who are working, 
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because wages are observable only when people are employed. However, for those who are 
unemployed, their wages are equal to zero, but it does not mean, of course, the return to edu-
cation for them is equal to zero. The wages of the unemployed individuals are not observable, 
and they are not likely to be a random group from the population. Therefore, omitting them 
will also induce selection bias. 
The most important type of selection bias in analysing PSWP is the first type, i.e. self-selection 
bias, because the self-selection bias problem cannot be easily overcome by better sampling 
design, as one would do to deal with the other two types.  
In conventional microeconometric literature, Hausman test and Wald exogeneity test are often 
used to detect the endogeneity bias, so it can also be used to test for self-selection bias. However, 
it is only useful for a reduced-form econometric model, which has no microeconomic theoret-
ical foundation (microfoundation). One contribution of this thesis is to propose a new test (and 
estimation) procedure based on simulation of the microfounded economic model. 
2.3 Solution to Selection Bias 
It is common in applied microeconomics and actually in the whole social science that the data 
collected may not be random and are subject to selection bias. In other words, the probability 
of being sampled for each individual is different. Since the subjects in question are human 
beings with free will to make their own decisions, the individuals under observation are usually 
not sampled in the way carried out in controlled experiments of natural science. The distinction 
between the observational data and experimental data implies that the sampled individuals 
may not represent the whole population with equal weights. 
From this point of view, selection bias can be treated as a data problem. That is to say, it causes 
distortion of a statistical analysis, due to the method of collecting data. If this data problem is 
not taken into account properly, then the estimates are biased and conclusions drawn are mis-
leading. In other words, the estimates can only reflect the behaviour in a particular sample, and 
the conclusions are not generalisable to the whole population. 
Alternatively, selection bias problem can also be regarded as a model specification error or 
endogeneity bias problem (Heckman, 1976, 1979). Given that the non-randomly selected sam-
ples are not random, then this non-randomness must be caused by some latent factor. If this 
latent factor is omitted, then some regressors must be correlated with the error term (containing 
the omitted variable). Put differently, the selection bias problem is interpreted as an endogene-
ity problem due to an omitted variable. 
If the selection bias problem is treated as a data problem, then a straightforward solution is to 
change the way of interpreting the estimates. It must be made clear that the conclusions drawn 
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from the regressions are only valid within the specific range represented by the sample. For 
example, the estimated return on education is only for those who are working, rather than for 
the whole labour force. In contrast, if the selection bias problem is treated as a model problem, 
one obvious remedy is to construct some proxy for the missing selection effect or to use instru-
ment variables in estimation. To fundamentally resolve the problem, new modelling strategies 
are needed to explicitly deal with the selection bias within the model system. Heckman (1979) 
proposes an influential two-equation model to explicitly address selection bias. Alternative 
methods include treatment effects models and simultaneous equation models. The following 
section will critically review the traditional econometric modelling methods.  
3 Econometric Modelling Methods 
There are four main types of method to obtain PSWP in the microeconometric literature.  
 Type 1: Single-Equation-Regression Method. It directly estimates the coefficient of the 
dummy variable describing whether or not working in public sector based on a wage 
determination equation. The simplest way is OLS as in Blackaby et al (2012), but in-
strumental variables (IV) and quantile regression are also commonly used to correct for 
endogeneity and outliers.  
 Type 2: Decomposition-Based Method. Based on two separate regressions on the sub-
samples, it allows for sectoral heterogeneities in all regressors (slopes) in addition to 
the sector average (intercept). This type of method includes Blinder-Oaxaca decompo-
sition adopted in the early literatures (Smith, 1976; Gunderson, 1979) and the later ex-
tensions by Juhn et al (1993) and Melly (2005).  
 Type 3: Matching-Based Method. Based on a sector choice regression, it calculates the 
wage premium by finding the counterpart individuals in the two sectors in terms of a 
certain matching criterion. The most popular matching-based methods are Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) and Nearest Neighbour Matching (NNM), as used in Ramoni-
Perazzi and Bellante (2006) and Gibson (2009). 
 Type 4: Multiple-Equation-Regression Method. The fourth type includes the approach 
developed by Lee (1978) and Heckman (1979), the treatment effect models, and sim-
ultaneous equation models. They address the problem of selection bias by adding an 
explicit selection equation accounting for the sector choice, so that the estimated coef-
ficients in the wage equation are unbiased. 
Though both decomposition-based methods (type 2) and matching-based methods (type 3) in-
volve running a regression, there are some fundamental differences. First, the decomposition-
based methods require running a regression of wage equation on two subsamples, while the 
matching-based methods require running a regression of sector choice on the entire sample. 
Second, the decomposition-based methods assume that the behaviour of individuals in the two 
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sectors are different (so two separate regressions), while the matching-based methods believe 
that they follow the same behaviour (so only one pooled regression) and it is possible to find 
the counterfactual individual in different sectors. Third, the regressions in the first stage of 
decomposition-based methods are directly used to calculate the wage premium, while those in 
the first stage of matching-based methods are conducted just to provide a matching criterion. 
Thus, it does not require a strictly correct model specification. 
The multiple-equation-regression methods (type 4) integrate the features of both type 2 and 
type 3 methods into the benchmark methods (type 1). There are usually two equations in a 
multiple-equation model, with one describing how individuals make decisions on which sector 
to work (a feature of type 3) and the other describing how wage is determined (a feature of type 
1 and 2). However, the disadvantage of multiple-equation-regression method is obvious too—
if there is any mis-specification or mistakes in one of the two equations, the errors are likely to 
contaminate the whole system. 
Both single-equation-regression methods (type 1) and multiple-equation-regression methods 
(type 4) specify an earnings equation or wage equation following Mincer (1974) human capital 
model. The difference is that the latter corrects for the selection bias using another equation, 
while the single-equation-regression method either ignores the problem of omitted variables 
(OLS and quantile regression) or deals with it using a quasi-multiple-equation method (e.g. IV). 
As argued in the previous subsection, the self-selection bias problem can be interpreted as 
omitted variable or endogeneity problem. To remove this bias, IV makes use of statistical re-
lationship between “excluded instruments” and the endogenous variables, but good instruments 
are very difficult to find in practice. Despite being categorised as a single-equation-regression 
method, IV actually involves more than just one equation in estimation (that is why it is also 
called 2SLS). We argue that it is closer to single-equation method since the first stage of IV is 
usually based on statistical observation rather than economic theory. Quantile regression is 
another single-equation-regression method to mitigate the bias by painting a more complete 
picture of the distribution of wage rather than just for the mean of wage. In contrast, the multi-
ple-equation methods, such as Heckman selection model and treatment effect models, construct 
and estimate a separate sector selection equation together with the wage equation. But arguably, 
there is a similar problem of choice of additional variables in the selection equation as with use 
of instruments in the IV estimation. 
In addition to these techniques based on cross-sectional data, there are also various methods in 
estimating the wage premium using techniques for time-series data and panel data (Disney, 
2007). For example, Disney and Gosling (2003) use the privatisation programme of the 1990s 
in the UK as a natural experiment to avoid the problems of self-selection and measurement 
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error. This enables them to use panel data methods to control for individual unobserved differ-
ences that do not change over time. However, the application of these methods depends on the 
data availability. Given this limitation, cross-sectional methods are still the most popular choice 
in the literature of PSWP.  
The following subsections describe the literature history, the mechanisms, advantages and dis-
advantages of the four types of econometric methods. A comparison among the four types of 
methods are put upfront in Table 2: 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Sectoral heterogeneity no yes no no 
System-Based no no no yes 
Wage Determination yes yes no yes 
Sector Choice no no yes yes 
Robust to Bias no no yes yes 
Table 2 Comparison of the Econometric Modelling Methods 
3.1 Type 1: Single-Equation-Regression Method 
Inclusion of a dummy variable describing whether or not the individual is working in the public 
sector may seem to be the most straightforward way of estimating the PSWP. It ranges from 
the simplest OLS to more complicated procedures such as IV and quantile regression. The 
advantage of this type of method is that an explicit monetised “return” to working in public 
sector can be estimated. In contrast, the decomposition-based method only provides a relative 
measure of the proportion of wage differential which can be explained by just working in public 
sector. However, the main disadvantage of this type of method is that it is usually subject to 
selection bias. 
3.1.1 OLS Regression 
If there is no endogeneity resulting from selection bias or omitted variables, a single-equation 
OLS regression would answer the research question. The earnings equation or wage determi-
nation equation is usually developed based on human capital theory (Becker, 1964) and return 
on education (Mincer, 1974). In particular, to estimate the PSWP, intercept dummy or slope 
dummy or both can be added into the benchmark equation to capture the difference across 
sectors. 
ln i i i iw D   β x . 
In the equation above, 𝛃 is a vector of coefficients measuring the “returns” to the individual 
characteristics 𝐱𝑖, such as education, experience, age, gender, marriage, and so on. 𝐷𝑖 is the 
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dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the individual works in public sector and 0 if works in 
private sector. Thus, 𝛿 is the PSWP to be estimated. 
This method is applied by some recent studies, such as Chatterji et al (2010), Dolton and Make-
peace (2011), and Blackaby et al (2012). Despite the inaccuracy due to selection bias, OLS 
provides a convenient tool to paint the rough picture of PSWP in terms of a variety of dimen-
sions, such as gender, age, region and education. 
3.1.2 IV Regression 
It is arguable that the wage equation is often mis-specified due to omitted variables, such as 
ability and other unobservable propensities which affect the choice of working in public sector. 
This self-selection bias leads to endogeneity problem, and OLS estimator will be biased. 
Since the biasedness of OLS regression can be interpreted as endogeneity or omitted variable 
problem, one straightforward approach to this is to use instrumental variables. Voinea and 
Mihaescu (2011) use the variable “whether there are any family members working in the public 
sector”. Another example is Disney and Gosling (2003), who construct an instrument based on 
the difference in propensity to work in the public sector after and before the privatisation pro-
gramme. However, due to data availability, it is difficult to find valid and strong instruments 
in practice. The inefficiency and large standard errors caused by weak instruments may bring 
even bigger problem than the biasedness of OLS. 
As mentioned earlier, the IV estimator lies between the single-equation and multiple-equation 
methods. It is also called two-stage least squares (2SLS) in the sense that all the endogenous 
variables should be regressed on the instruments in the first stage, and apply OLS to the or-
thogonised variables to obtain the unbiased estimates. The first stage of IV aims to remove the 
correlations between the endogenous variables and the error term, in a very similar way to the 
multiple-equation methods. It is categorised in the single-equation-regression method, because 
the instruments used in the first stage may be purely statistical correlation without any eco-
nomic theory behind. Therefore, orthogonisation (the first stage) in IV estimation is more a 
statistical procedure than an economic modelling. 
3.1.3 Quantile Regression 
While least squares regression techniques (including OLS and IV) estimate the partial effect of 
a regressor on the mean of dependent variable, quantile regression investigates the partial effect 
of a regressor on the specified quantile of the dependent variable. The specified quantile could 
be median or any percentile of the distribution of the dependent variable. Hence, quantile re-
gression provides more information of the conditional distribution of wage.  
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Similar to the advantage of median over mean, quantile regression is more robust against out-
liers. One crucial assumption of OLS is that the error term has precisely the same distribution 
whatever values may be taken by the components of the regressors. This case is referred to as 
a pure location shift, since it assumes that regressor affects only the location of the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable, not its scale or any other aspect of its distributional shape. 
However, in most practical cases, regressors may influence the conditional distribution of the 
response variable, such as expanding its dispersion, stretching one tail and compressing the 
other, and inducing multimodality. Explicit investigation of these effects via quantile regres-
sion can provide a more nuanced view of the stochastic relationship between variables, and 
therefore a more informative empirical analysis. In particular, the quantile regression coeffi-
cients in the earnings equation can be interpreted as rates of return to skills at different points 
of the wage distribution (Buchinsky, 1994). 
This idea of quantile regression was first proposed in the 18th century by Boscovich and sub-
sequently developed by Laplace and Edgeworth. A good introduction of quantile regression 
can be found in Koenker and Hallock (2001). Technically speaking, least squares regression is 
to minimise the symmetrically weighted sum of squares of residuals, and quantile regression 
is to minimise the sum of asymmetrically weighted absolute residuals. For the 𝑝th quantile: 
 
 
 : :
ˆ arg min 1
i i i i
i i i ii i y i i y
p y p y
   
      
  x β x ββ
β β x β x . 
Note that quantile regression is usually combined with the decomposition-based method, espe-
cially in JMP decomposition method. 
3.1.4 Other Regression Methods 
Many papers also use panel data models (e.g. fixed effects and random effects) when longitu-
dinal observations are available. Depending on whether the data is individual-level or aggre-
gate-level, different specifications are used. For example, Blanchflower and Bryson (2010) use 
quarterly LFS individual-level panel data in the UK and find that there is a higher union mem-
bership wage premium in the public sector. Nunzianta (2005) use country-level panel data for 
18 OECD countries and find that institutional factors in labour market significantly contribute 
to the wage premium. 
A different set of estimation and test procedures are necessary for panel data models, such as 
panel cointegration test and Hausman test. Since the current study only use cross-sectional data, 
no further details of the panel data methods are reviewed here. A recent review on these can be 
found in Afonso and Gomes (2014). 
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3.2 Type 2: Decomposition-Based Method 
The regression-based method assumes that all the slope parameters are the same for individuals 
working in both sectors, but this is obviously not quite true. For example, the importance of 
education to a doctor in the NHS (public sector)1 is much higher than that to a bartender (private 
sector). There are many different decomposition techniques. 
3.2.1 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
The decomposition-based method is originally developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), 
and the first application to estimating the PSWP is found in Smith (1976). Its main advantage 
over the single-equation regression is that it does not impose the equality restriction on the 
other slope parameters across sectors. Though in principle slope dummies can be used in OLS 
to control for the slope differences, very few papers use them. The raw average pay differential 
can be decomposed into two portions: 
   
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The first portion (i) is due to the sectoral difference in coefficients or returns, while the second 
portion (ii) is due to different individual characteristics. The latter term (ii) is called “legitimate” 
pay differential because it reflects difference in characteristics of individuals, such as education, 
experience, etc. In contrast, the first term (i) is considered as wage premium or economic rent, 
which reflects the pure pay differential paid for the same characteristics.  
A simple extension of this decomposition is proposed by Daymont and Andrisani (1984), 
whereby the third component (iii) is used to capture the interaction between (i) and (ii): 
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1 ONS estimates for the NHS differ from the headline figure produced by the NHS Information Centre (IC). 
This reflects the wider UK coverage (IC figures are for England only) plus the exclusion by ONS of general 
practitioners (GPs). ONS, in accordance with National Accounts practice, classifies GPs as part of the private 
sector. ONS also includes ‘hospital practitioners and clinical assistants’ who work in hospitals on a salaried pay 
scale but generally work as GPs leading the IC to exclude them from their totals to avoid double counting. 
When these factors are allowed for, ONS and NHS data can be shown to be identical. 
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Whichever decomposition method is used, according to Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), the de-
composed raw differences in wage can be interpreted as due to a different “productivity” or 
“endowment”, advantage of working in the public sector, and the disadvantage of working in 
the private sector. There are many ways2 of calculating the contribution of each difference to 
the average coefficient vector 𝛃∗, depending on how to select the general weighting matrix 𝛀: 
 ˆ ˆG P   β Ωβ I Ω β . 
3.2.2 Terrell Decomposition 
The validity of both decomposition methods depends on the validity of the OLS regression in 
the first stage, which in turn depends on two key assumptions. First, given the observed indi-
vidual characteristics, workers are randomly distributed across sectors. Second, pay differen-
tials do not represent differences for non-pecuniary job attributes of each sector. Obviously, 
both assumptions do not hold, because the choice of sector is endogenous and sectors offer 
fundamentally different nonwage job attributes. Venti (1987) decomposes the pay differential 
between the public and private sectors into four sources: first, economic rent or overpayment 
by government employers; second, observed productivity or skill differences; third, unob-
served productivity or skill differences; and fourth, equalising differences in pay for nonpecu-
niary job attributes. The original approach used in Smith (1976) only distinguishes the first two, 
while the latter two are ignored. 
Regarding the third source ignored by Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, one extension is to take 
into account the unobserved characteristics, based on Heckman selection model (Terrell, 1993). 
If the earnings equation omits some unobservable characteristics that are related to the choice 
of working in public sector, then the OLS estimates are subject to self-selection bias. Heckman 
selection model (detailed in the next subsection) enables one to control for this omitted variable 
by constructing a regressor (inverse Mills ratio) from the selection equation. Hence, there is 
one more component (iii) compared to Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition: 
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3.2.3 JMP Decomposition 
Another extension of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 
(1993) (JMP decomposition hereafter). It takes into account the distribution of residuals, based 
                                                          
2 For example, Cotton (1988), Neumark (1988) and Reimers (1983). We will use Cotton (1988) method, setting 
the weight equal to the proportion of the “treated”, i.e. public sector workers. 
18 
 
on quantile regression. The overall observed wage differential across sectors can be decom-
posed in three components, using the quantile rather than the mean of the dependent variable: 
     
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ˆ ˆˆ ˆln ln
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
G P G G G P P P
G P G P G P G P
w w  
 
     
      
β x β x
β β x β x x
 
This method is usually based on separate quantile regression for each sector. The first term (i) 
and the second term (ii) are similar to those in Smith (1976), except for the interpretation is in 
terms of some specified quantile rather than mean. In addition to the identified contributions 
from difference across sectoral returns and individual characteristics, there is an extra term (iii) 
corresponding to an unmeasured component of the difference and consists of unidentified sec-
toral and individual effects. 
A problem of JMP decomposition is that it does not account for heteroscedasticity of the error 
term (Melly, 2005). If the error term is independently, identically and normally distributed, 
then JMP decomposition is efficient. However, if this assumption does not hold, this procedure 
may produce misleading results. Based on DiNardo et al (1996) and Lemieux (2002), Melly 
(2005) develops an extension to JMP decomposition to deal with heteroscedasticity. First, 
quantile regression is used to estimate the conditional wage distribution. Then, the conditional 
distribution is integrated over the range of regressors to obtain an estimate of the unconditional 
distribution.  
3.3 Type 3: Matching-Based Method 
The ultimate problem is to estimate the wage premium between public and private sectors, and 
a key principle is to compare like with like. It is not meaningful to compare a highly educated 
individual in public sector with a very poorly educated individual in private sector, since these 
two persons are different in various dimensions, i.e. “comparing oranges with apples”. Unfor-
tunately, naive methods of using simple descriptive statistics will result in the problem of se-
lection bias. Of course, the most ideal way is to use the wage of an individual if he works in 
public sector minus the wage of the same individual if he works in private sector. However, it 
is impossible to observe the counterfactual wage if he works in the other sector. Nevertheless, 
it is possible to find the closest match for him in the other sector to mitigate the selection bias.  
An individual, whether he works in public sector or private sector, has several dimensions of 
properties, such as sex, age, education, region, industry, occupation, etc. It is almost impossible 
to find an exact match for an individual with so many dimensions of characteristics. As a result, 
it is attractive to use a single-valued “propensity score” to summarise these characteristics, and 
match individuals in the two sectors in terms of this propensity score. Once matches are found, 
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it is then easy to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT), average treatment 
effect for the untreated (ATU), and the average treatment effect (ATE). 
In the context of PSWP, “working in public sector” can be regarded as “treatment”, so those 
working in private sector are the “control group”. The ATT here can be interpreted as “the 
wage differential if one changed her current work from public sector to private sector, given 
that she is actually now working in the public sector”. The ATU can be interpreted as “the 
wage differential if one changed his current work from private sector to public sector, given 
that she is actually now working in the private sector”. The ATE is just an average between 
ATT and ATU. In practice, there are two popular matching techniques to obtain the treatment 
effects (ATT/ATU/ATE).  
3.3.1 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
First introduced by Paul Rosenbaum and Donald Rubin (1983), PSM estimates the ATE from 
observational data by imputing the missing potential outcome for each subject using an average 
of the outcomes of similar subjects that receive the other treatment level. Similarity between 
subjects is based on estimated treatment probabilities, known as propensity scores. There are 
two steps in implementation: 
First, the propensity score for each observation in both public and private sectors is to be ob-
tained. The logit or probit models can be used for this purpose, with “working in public sector” 
as the dependent variable and a variety of exogenous variables (such as sex, age, education, 
industry, etc.) as the independent variables. The predicted probability of working in public 
sector is used as the propensity score. 
The second step is to choose the algorithm of matching individuals in the two groups. The most 
popular approach is to use calliper matching. That is to find the two individuals with closest 
propensity scores in the two sectors, but only use them when the difference of propensity scores 
is within the pre-set calliper range. In most studies, a convention of 0.01 is used as the range 
within which matches are valid. 
The range of propensity scores with both “control group” (those working in private sector) and 
“treated group” (those working in public sector) is referred to as “common support”. While 
there are cases where the range of propensity scores for the control group is different from that 
of the treated group, it is called “off common support”. Only matches within the common sup-
port are used to estimate the treatment effects. 
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3.3.2 Nearest-Neighbour Matching (NNM) 
Similarly, NNM also estimates the ATE by imputing the missing potential outcome for each 
subject using an average of the outcomes of similar subjects that receive the other treatment 
level. The difference is measured by a weighted function of the covariates for each observation. 
The NNM method determines the “nearest” by the Mahalanobis distance, in which the weights 
are based on the inverse of the covariates’ variance-covariance matrix 𝐕: 
   1MahalanobisDistance
  x μ V x μ , where 𝛍 is the mean vector of 𝐱. 
It includes the Euclidean distance as a special case where 𝐕 is an identity matrix. After match-
ing criterion is estimated, the rest of the NNM method is the same as PSM. In some statistical 
software, NNM is incorporated into PSM, but NNM does not require estimating a choice model 
before generating the matching criterion. 
3.4 Type 4: Multiple-Equation-Regression Model 
The original purpose of this method is to solve the problem of selection bias problem, which 
can be interpreted as an omitted variable problem (Heckman, 1979). Heckman selection model 
is usually applied to construct a proxy for the omitted latent variable in order to solve the se-
lection bias problem. Another popular method within multiple-equation framework is treat-
ment effects model, which considers the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment, 
conditional on two sets of regressors. Other methods with simultaneous equations system also 
exist in literature, but Heckman selection model and treatment effects model are the most pop-
ular techniques. 
3.4.1 Heckman Selection Model 
The Heckman selection model is developed originally to address the selection bias problem 
due to unobserved factors affecting the probability of being “treated”. If the individuals in the 
treated group share some specific characteristics, then the OLS estimates of the treatment effect 
as well as all the other slopes are biased. Heckman (1979) proposes a two-equation model to 
account for this selection bias.  
To see this, the first stage of Heckman selection model is to estimate a “selection equation”, 
with the selectivity variable (usually the “treatment” dummy) being determined by a set of 
exogenous regressors. Usually, probit is used because the error term is assumed to have a stand-
ard normal distribution. Following that, for each observation in the selected sample, compute 
the inverse Mills ratio 𝜆𝑖 (conditional probability), which is used to account for the selection 
bias in the outcome equation. Note that Φ(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
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standard normal distribution and 𝜙(∙) is the corresponding probability density function. The 
second stage is to run OLS on the original equation, including 𝜆𝑖 as an additional regressor.  
Selection Equation:    
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The coefficient of 𝜆𝑖 is defined as 𝛿 = 𝜌𝜎, where 𝜌 is the correlation coefficient between the 
two error terms, and 𝜎 is the adjusted standard error of the outcome equation. That is to say, If 
the error term in the selection equation (𝜖1𝑖) is correlated with that in the outcome equation 
(𝜖2𝑖), then single equation OLS estimator is biased due to omitting the inverse Mill ratio. How-
ever, if the coefficient 𝛾 of selection bias (𝜆𝑖) is not significant, which implies a zero correlation 
coefficient (𝜌), then there is no selection bias.  
However, it may be useful for estimating the 𝛃 of the model, but it is not very useful in esti-
mating the PSWP, which is the ultimate purpose. This is because the key regressor 𝐷𝑖 does not 
enter the wage determination equation at all. Note that, strictly speaking, the coefficient in front 
of ?̂?𝑖 cannot be interpreted as the wage premium, because ?̂?𝑖 means the propensity to work in 
the public sector, not the status of working in the public sector. Loosely speaking, nevertheless, 
if this propensity is equal to 1, then the individual works in the public sector with 100% prob-
ability, so we could interpret the coefficient 𝛿 as the counterpart of the “treatment effect”. The 
difference here is that the treatment effect is the effect of a binary variable (𝐷𝑖), while the 
coefficient 𝛿 here is the effect of a continuous variable (𝜆𝑖). 
As shown later, the first stage of Heckman selection model might be exactly the same as that 
of PSM, i.e. a probit regression to obtain the fitted value of propensity for working in the public 
sector. However, the purposes of this step are different. In Heckman selection model, the first 
stage is used in the second regression to in order to remove selection bias problem. In contrast, 
in PSM, the fitted propensity is used as the matching criterion to link individuals in different 
sectors. The first stage of PSM only serves as a matching criterion, rather than a serious esti-
mation of any causal relationship. 
3.4.2 Endogenous Treatment Effects Model 
Another multiple-equation-regression method is endogenous treatment effects model, because 
working in the public sector (the “treatment”) is not randomly allocated. In other words, the 
“conditional independence” is violated3. That is, after conditioning on covariates, when no 
                                                          
3 If the conditional independence assumption is satisfied, then the usual treatment effects model can be used, 
including the two matching-based methods (type 3) as special cases. 
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unobservable variable affects both treatment assignment and the potential outcomes, the po-
tential outcomes are conditionally independent of the treatment. The intuition of the conditional 
independence is that only the covariates 𝐱 affect both the treatment and the potential outcomes. 
Any other factors that affect the treatment must be independent of the treatment. This assump-
tion is also known as “unconfoundedness” or “selection-on-observables” in the literature (Ros-
enbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman, 1997; Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004; Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005; Tsiatis, 2006; Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; 
Wooldridge, 2010). 
The outcome equation is augmented with a selection equation (which is usually a probit or logit 
model): 
Selection Equation:    1Pr 1i i i iD F D     α z  
Outcome Equation: 2i i i iy D   β x  
In the selection equation, 𝐷𝑖 is the sector choice variable which is assumed to stem from an 
unobservable latent variable: 
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The variance-covariance matrix for the two error terms 𝜖1𝑖 and 𝜖2𝑖 is: 
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Different from Heckman selection model, the sector choice dummy is explicitly included in 
the outcome equation. The ATE and the other parameters of the model can be estimated by two 
ways: the consistent two-step estimator and full information maximum likelihood estimator. 
The likelihood function is given in Maddala (1983) and Greene (2012).  
3.4.3 Simultaneous Equations Model 
Another early attempt to correct for selection bias using multiple-equation method is Venti 
(1987). He develops a simultaneous equation model, with a job acceptance decision equation 
(demand), job offer decision equation (supply), as well as equations describing the probabilities 
of working in the two sectors. Maximum likelihood is applied to estimate this simultaneous 
equation model.  
An innovative aspect of his method is that the labour supply does not need to equal the labour 
demand, i.e. there may be a queue waiting to work in public sector. This enables to measure 
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the degree of distortion in public sector wage, because there should be little queue if there is 
no PSWP. 
Lamo et al (2005) and Afonso and Gomes (2014) use system-based estimation such as 3SLS 
to explain the interactions between wages in the two sectors, which are modelled as two sepa-
rate equations. The drawback of simultaneous equation models is that, if there is a problem 
with one of the equations, the biasedness will be spilled over to the whole system. 
4 Economic Modelling Methods 
The economic modelling method is a leap forward to directly confront the economic theories 
against the empirical evidence. The econometric modelling methods are usually criticised as 
being ad hoc, because the empirical models are only loosely related to the economic theory, 
either in a reduced-form model (type 1 to type 3) or in a structural-form model (type 4). This 
is a philosophy of “let data speak” because the modelling process is mainly guided by the 
information contained in the data. At the other end of the methodological spectrum is the eco-
nomic modelling method, which derives the model strictly following the microfounded opti-
misation behaviour. The resulting equation explaining the endogenous variables (wage and 
working hour) are nonlinear because the setup of the optimisation problem, such as utility func-
tion, is nonlinear.  
This modelling strategy is often criticised to be too restrictive, because a parametric model is 
very difficult to capture the complicated reality. However, a loosely implied econometric 
model (usually linearised) is not able to capture the complicated reality either, while losing the 
strict theoretical foundation. Therefore, it is not convincing to adopt econometric modelling 
methods on this ground. Moreover, it is also logically coherent to keep the economic model as 
it is set up if we are to empirically verify or falsify the associated economic theory. This trend 
of “let theory speak” has been pushed forward in the latest two decades in the macroeconomic 
DSGE literature with the advances in computing power. One motivation of this paper is to 
bring this new trend of microfoundation “back” to microeconomics. 
In the macroeconomic literature, there has already been an increasing interest in addressing the 
PSWP at the aggregate level. These models usually have two sectors to obtain differentiated 
wages, though an early RBC model proposed by Finn (1998) imposes unified wage across 
sectors due to its assumption of competitive market. In contrast, Ardagna (2007) develops a 
dynamic general equilibrium model with a unionised labour market allowing for separate 
wages in private and public sectors. Afonso and Gomes (2014) establish a dynamic two-sector 
labour market equilibrium model with search and matching frictions. In this paper, because the 
main purpose is methodological, we will employ the simplest neoclassical labour economic 
model (i.e. ignoring the union wage setting power and the searching frictions) to introduce 
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Indirect Inference (II) techniques to microdata analysis. A more complicated non-competitive 
labour market model can be utilised to the II test and estimation with macrodata analysis fol-
lowing the DSGE literature. 
Moreover, note that there is a discrepancy between the model and the data in the current mac-
roeconomic literature on PSWP—the economic model is microfounded, but the data is aggre-
gated. There is great information loss due to the aggregation/averaging from the individual-
level microdata to the aggregate-level macrodata, so the analysis based on the macrodata is 
logically less efficient and empirically subject to higher measurement error.  
It is noticed that there has already been some attempt to combine microeconomic model with 
the microeconometric techniques in the industrial organisation literature (e.g. Berry et al, 1995). 
However, they apply IV (or GMM) technique to estimate the structural microeconomic model. 
It can of course estimate the model by minimising the gap between model/population moments 
and the sample moments, but it CANNOT address a more fundamental question—is the model 
true? Any model can be estimated by any method (including GMM, ML or Bayesian), but how 
do we know the estimated model is a good model? GMM, ML or Bayesian methods can only 
test model against model, or specification against specification (e.g. t test, F test, likelihood 
ratio test, etc.). They cannot test the model against the data. This is the methodological ad-
vantage of indirect inference here. By using a widely accepted auxiliary model (linear regres-
sion here), we can directly measure the distance between the data and the model. If the distance 
between the model-simulated data behaviour is too far from the actual data behaviour, and this 
distance is quantified by a strictly defined Wald statistic. 
In summary, the traditional econometric modelling method links ad hoc econometric model 
with microdata (with a weak theoretical basis), while the traditional economic modelling 
method links microfounded economic model with macrodata (with a weak empirical basis). As 
a middle way, I will use a very simple neoclassical labour economic model to introduce the 
idea of estimating the microfounded model using the microdata. This pushes the theoretical 
and empirical studies in microeconomics closer, a trend in macroeconomics since the 1980s 
led by the New Classical school of thought (e.g. Kydland and Prescott, 1982). 
Regarding the inference techniques, there are two general ways of estimating a microfounded 
economic model: (i) data distribution based estimator, such as maximum likelihood and Bayes-
ian, and (ii) data behaviour based estimator, such as Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), 
Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) and Indirect Inference (II). The distribution-based es-
timator is more efficient because it utilises all the distributional information of the endogenous 
variables in estimation, but is subject to higher possibility of mis-specification in the assump-
tions. The second group of estimators usually only focuses on the moment properties of the 
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distribution, so have much more flexibility and robustness. One limitation is that it is not capa-
ble of capturing the nonlinearities in the distribution, such as asymmetry and kurtosis. Luckily, 
the labour market data do not show such abnormalities in the distribution of wage, so a data 
behaviour based estimator is preferred because it is robust to mis-specifications. A detailed 
discussion in comparing these two estimators can be found in Meenagh et al (2009), Le et al 
(2011) and Dai et al (2015) in the context of macroeconomic DSGE models. 
Within the data behaviour estimators, GMM and SMM use the moment properties of the actual 
data as the criterion to estimate the structural parameters. The objective function is the weighted 
sum of the gap between the theoretical moments (as in GMM) or simulated moments (as in 
SMM) implied by the model and the observed data moments. The moments usually include 
means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients. They can be regarded as special cases 
of II, in which the auxiliary model can be any data properties and features, not only the moment 
properties. For example in Le et al (2010), the auxiliary model is VAR(1) to summarise the 
joint probability of the data behaviour of all the observables. Alternatively, impulse response 
functions are also used as auxiliary functions to focus on the dynamic feature of the data 
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Christiano et al, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006). II generalises 
the criterion to any data behaviour one can abstract from the data, including simple moments 
(to capture the volatilities), impulse response functions (to capture the dynamics) and VAR (to 
capture both). In our case, we have four choices for the auxiliary function, i.e. the aforemen-
tioned four types of econometric modelling methods. Therefore, we can systematically inte-
grate the econometric and the economic modelling methods. Furthermore, one advantage of II 
is its flexibility. The auxiliary model needs not be correctly specified; when it is, II is equivalent 
to maximum likelihood (Gourieroux et al, 1993; Smith, n.d.). 
4.1 Indirect Inference Test 
Suppose the structural form of a model is a system of equations composing of some endogenous 
variables (𝐲) to be explained and exogenous variables (𝐳) to explain 𝐲, linked by parameters 
(𝛉). Note that the exogenous variable vector (𝐳) can include both conditioning variables (𝐱) 
and the structural innovations (𝛆): 
    , , , , , 0f f y z θ y x ε θ . 
A clarification of terminology is due here. In different strands of literature, the use of jargons 
varies, but in economic models “error terms” usually refer to the exogenous variables, which 
are often further expressed as a deterministic component (a function of “conditioning variables” 
or “state variables”—such as other exogenous variables and predetermined variables) plus a 
stochastic component (the innovations). In many articles, structural innovations are also called 
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“shocks” (e.g. productivity shock in RBC, markup shocks in DSGE), but error terms are some-
times treated as “endogenous”, because they are not mathematically different from other en-
dogenous variables in the structural equations—depending on other variables and the shocks. 
In terms of this broad definition, the number of model equations equal to the number of “en-
dogenous” variables. Here, the model equations include both the structural equations (de-
scribing the optimisation/equilibrium conditions of the endogenous control variables) and the 
error structure equations (describing how the error terms are constructed from the condition-
ing variables and the innovations/shocks). Equivalently, if we still treat the error terms as ex-
ogenous (as in this thesis), then the number of structural equations should be equal to the num-
ber endogenous variables (narrowly and naturally defined). Besides, in econometric terminol-
ogy, “error terms” refer to the disturbance, which may (or preferably may not) be correlated to 
the regressors or covariates in the reduced-form or structural-form econometric models. Note 
that the structural equations (or the structural form) of an economic model are different from 
the structural-form econometric models—the former are derived, while the latter are ad hoc. 
Assume the model can be solved in a reduced form: 
    , , ,g g y z θ x ε θ . 
Given some calibrated parameter values 𝛉0, the observable endogenous variables (𝐲
(𝑎)) and 
the conditioning variables (𝐱(𝑎)), we will be able to compute all the actual innovations termed 
as 𝛆(𝑎) based on the structural form 𝑓(𝐲(𝑎), 𝐱(𝑎), 𝛆(𝑎), 𝛉0) = 0. To achieve identification, the 
number of shocks must be equal to the number of endogenous variables; otherwise, we will 
have “stochastic singularity”.  
Following that, the actual innovations (𝛆(𝑎)) are then bootstrapped 𝑆 times, resulting in 𝑆 sets 
of exogenous variable realisations 𝐳(𝑠). Using these 𝑆 sets of exogenous variables, we will be 
able to simulate 𝑆 sets of endogenous variables 𝐲(𝑠). This is done by simply substituting in the 
bootstrapped exogenous variables and calibrated parameters into the reduced form: 
      0, ,s a sgy x ε θ . 
Then, we can choose an appropriate auxiliary model to summarise the feature of both the actual 
and the simulated data of the endogenous variables. The parameter of the auxiliary model is 
denoted as 𝛝, so there will be a 𝛝(𝑎) based on the actual data 𝐱(𝑎) and 𝑆 sets of 𝛝(𝑠) based on 
the simulated data 𝐱(𝑠). A standard Wald test can be implemented by computing the Wald sta-
tistic: Wald(𝛉0) ≡ (𝛝
(𝑎) − ?̅?(𝑠))
′
(𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝛝(𝑠)])
−1
(𝛝(𝑎) − ?̅?(𝑠)). 
The Wald statistic has a 𝜒2 distribution with a degree of freedom equal to the dimension of the 
parameter vector 𝛝. If the Wald statistic lies within the 95% confidence interval, then the orig-
inal model 𝑓(𝐲, 𝐳, 𝛉0) = 0 is said to be able to generate the actual data, i.e. the model is true. 
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Otherwise, the model is rejected. The flowchart in Figure 3 illustrates the workings of II test 
procedures. 
Note that the conclusion of the test does not depend on the likelihood of the data, but a specific 
feature of the data—the chosen auxiliary model or auxiliary function of the data. That is why 
it is called indirect inference, in contrast to the direct inference based on the data. It implies 
that an accepted model may only do a good job in matching some specific data features, so II 
is a weaker test of the model, compared to the likelihood ratio test. As a result, there are two 
advantages of II test. On the one hand, it provides a formal test of a model against the data, 
while the conventional likelihood ratio test can only relatively test one model against another 
model. On the other hand, II test is more flexible and customisable for different modelling 
purposes. Instead of trying to match the whole data distribution, one can choose any feature of 
the data to be matched.  
 
Figure 3 Flow Chart of Indirect Inference 
4.2 Indirect Inference Estimation 
Furthermore, as noted above, we implement the II test for a given calibration 𝛉0. As a starting 
point, the model may be rejected because the initial calibration may not serve the model the 
best according to the auxiliary model criterion. An optimisation procedure can then be carried 
out to search for the optimal calibration ?̂?, which minimises the objective function—Wald sta-
tistic. The procedure will raise the probability of accepting the model to the maximum possible. 
The resulting optimal calibration ?̂? is therefore the II estimation of the model parameter: 
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Note that the estimation here is a multivariate global optimisation problem, which has a sto-
chastic and non-smooth objective function. It is usually impossible to derive the analytical so-
lution for ?̂?. Instead, a numerical algorithm is usually used to search for the optimal calibration 
within the parameter space. Various global optimisation algorithms are available for this pur-
pose, such as simulated annealing and genetic algorithm. 
The simulated annealing algorithm is widely used by macroeconomic research, such as Le et 
al (2010, 2011). One disadvantage of simulated annealing is that the optimum may still depend 
on the starting point (despite the name of “global” optimisation algorithm). The genetic algo-
rithm provides a more thorough search in the parameter space using a population-based itera-
tion (simulated annealing is point-based iteration), and it is not dependent on the starting point. 
The genetic algorithm was initially developed by John Holland in the 1960s inspired by the 
evolution concept in the biological literature. It has been widely used in engineering, econom-
ics and finance recently (e.g. Foreman-Peck and Zhou, 2014). We will use this more robust 
algorithm to apply the II estimation. 
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CHAPTER II: THE DATA 
This chapter describes the dataset of the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) collected by the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK for 2001-2011. The dataset used in this study only 
includes individuals whose economic activity is known, accounting for a 25% random sample 
of individuals aged 20-64 years. Full-time students, unpaid family workers, and people on gov-
ernment training schemes are excluded.  
1 The Sampling Design 
The LFS is a unique source of information using international definitions of employment and 
unemployment and economic inactivity, together with a wide range of related topics such as 
occupation, training, hours of work and personal characteristics of household members aged 
16 years and over. It is used to inform social, economic and employment policy. The LFS was 
first conducted biennially from 1973-1983. Between 1984 and 1991 the survey was carried out 
annually and consisted of a quarterly survey conducted throughout the year and a “boost” sur-
vey in the spring quarter (data were then collected seasonally). From 1992 quarterly data were 
made available, with a quarterly sample size approximately equivalent to that of the previous 
annual data. The survey then became known as the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). 
From December 1994, data gathering for Northern Ireland moved to a full quarterly cycle to 
match the rest of the country, so the QLFS then covered the whole of the UK (though some 
additional annual Northern Ireland LFS datasets are also held at the UK Data Archive). From 
2006 the LFS has been run on calendar quarters i.e. January to March, April to June, July to 
September, and October to December instead of seasonal quarters i.e. March to May, June to 
August, September to November, and December to February. 
The target population of the LFS is based on the resident population in the UK. Specifically, 
the LFS aims to include all people resident in private households, resident in National Health 
Service accommodation, and young people living away from the parental home in a student 
hall of residence or similar institution during term time. The sample currently consists of 
around 41,000 responding (or imputed) households in Great Britain (GB) every quarter, repre-
senting about 0.16% the GB population. Data from approximately 1,600 households in North-
ern Ireland (NI) are added to this, representing about 0.23% of the NI population, allowing 
analysis of data relating to UK. 
The LFS retains each sample household for five consecutive quarters, with a fifth of the sample 
replaced each quarter. The main survey was designed to produce cross-sectional data, but the 
data on each individual have now been linked together to provide longitudinal information. 
The longitudinal data comprise two types of linked datasets, created using the weighting 
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method to adjust for non-response bias. The two-quarter datasets link data from two consecu-
tive waves, while the five-quarter datasets link across a whole year (for example January 2010 
to March 2011 inclusive) and contain data from all five waves. A full series of longitudinal 
data has been produced, going back to winter 1992. Linking together records to create a longi-
tudinal dimension can, for example, provide information on gross flows over time between 
different labour force categories (employed, unemployed and economically inactive). This will 
provide detail about people who have moved between the categories. Also, longitudinal infor-
mation is useful in monitoring the effects of government policies and can be used to follow the 
subsequent activities and circumstances of people affected by specific policy initiatives, and to 
compare them with other groups in the population. There are however methodological prob-
lems which could distort the data resulting from this longitudinal linking. The ONS continues 
to research these issues and advises that the presentation of results should be carefully consid-
ered, and warnings should be included with outputs where necessary. 
The same number of Wave 1 (new) addresses are selected each quarter. As illustrated in Figure 
4, in any given quarter, about one-fifth of the addresses in the entire sample are in Wave 1, 
one-fifth in Wave 2, and so on. Thus, between any two consecutive quarters, about 80% of the 
selected addresses are in common. 
 
Figure 4 Illustration of Rotational Sampling Design (Source: ONS) 
2 The Raw Wage Premium 
Since the key variable to be explained is wage, Table 12 in the Appendix summarises its im-
portant descriptive statistics for the whole sample (both weekly and hourly wage). The hourly 
wage is calculated based on the weekly wage and weekly working hours. It is arguable that 
hourly wage is preferred in later analysis because of the existence of part-time workers, who 
may work less and earn less on weekly basis.  
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One feature of wage is that the mean is greater than the median for both measures of wages 
and for all the years. That implies the wage distribution is not symmetric, but positively skewed. 
That is to say, there are more low income people than high income people in the sample. 
The hourly wage data is further disaggregated by sector and by gender to show a rough picture 
of the pay differential between public sector and private sector (Table 12 in the Appendix). The 
evolution of the raw PSWP is graphed in Figure 5. There are two stylised facts consistent with 
other literature: 
(i) There is a persistent PSWP observed over the 2000’s between public sector and 
private sector.  
(ii) The PSWP for females is greater than that for males. 
  
 
Figure 5 Raw Pay Differentials by Gender and Sector (Mean and Median) 
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3 The Working Hours 
Another endogenous variable to be explained within the general equilibrium framework is the 
“quantity” of labour (working hour), which is determined with the “price” of labour (wage). 
According to Hansen (1985), there are two types of decision to be made: one is whether or not 
to work (the “extensive margin”) and the other is how much to work (the “intensive margin”). 
In this study, we only focus on the latter, because all the data available are about the employed 
individuals. 
As shown in Figure 6, there are four stylised facts of working hours consistent with the evi-
dence identified by the existing literature.  
(i) The private sector workers tend to work longer hours than the public sector workers.  
(ii) Male workers are working longer hours than the female workers. 
(iii) There is a slight downward trend of working hours over time. 
(iv) The intensive margin is more stable than the extensive margin (measured by the 
unemployment rate, UR, on the right axis). 
 
Figure 6 Working Hours by Gender and Sector (Mean)  
Notes: The left axis is the working hours, and the right axis is the unemployment rate (percentage point). 
The descriptive statistics are informative, but the evidence does not control for the differences 
between individuals, such as education, age, work experience, etc. That is why we need the 
econometric models and economic models to identify the effect of working in the public sector 
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to explain whether and why PSWP exists. The covariates to be used in econometric modelling 
and economic modelling are defined in Table 15 in the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER III: ECONOMETRIC MODELLING METHOD 
This chapter applies all four types of econometric method reviewed in CHAPTER I to esti-
mating the PSWP in the UK based on the LFS data described in CHAPTER II. 
1 The Econometric Model of Wage Differential 
To empirically estimate the PSWP, some (loosely linked) theoretical grounds are needed for 
the econometric model. There are two key variables to be explained in the current study, i.e. 
how wage is determined and how sector is chosen. For simplicity, we will use the Classical (as 
well as neoclassical) equilibrium theory to develop the econometric model of wage determina-
tion, and the consumer theory to develop the econometric model of sector choice.  
Indeed, more sophisticated theories, such as wage bargaining (for wage determination) and 
search friction (for sector choice), can be used to provide a more realistic theoretical basis, but 
the main objective of this paper is methodological, and the neoclassical model still serves as 
the benchmark and contributes the most in explanatory power. Moreover, data is not available 
for incorporating the variables from those complicated theories into the econometric models. 
Thus, we will only focus on the two simple theories. 
1.1 The Econometric Model of Wage Determination 
According to the Classical (as well as neoclassical) labour economic theory, the equilibrium 
wage is determined by the interactions between the supply side (households or workers, who 
rationally maximise their utility) and the demand side (firms or employers, who rationally max-
imise their profit). A competitive labour market means all the individuals in the labour market 
have no wage setting power. All individuals in both parties are wage takers, not makers. The 
competitive equilibrium occurs when labour supply and labour demand are equal, i.e. market 
clears, generating a competitive wage and employment level. 
As assumed in the Classical theory, if workers are mobile and entry and exit of workers to the 
labour market is free, then there would be a single wage paid to all workers. The allocation of 
workers to firms equating the wage to the value of marginal product is also the allocation that 
maximises national income (this is also known as allocative efficiency). The “single wage” 
property of a competitive equilibrium has important implications for economic efficiency. In a 
competitive equilibrium the wage equals the value of marginal product of labour as a result of 
optimisation behaviour. As firms and workers move to the sector that provides the best oppor-
tunities, they eliminate wage differentials between private and public sectors. Therefore, work-
ers of given skills have the same value of marginal product of labour in all markets. The allo-
cation of workers to firms that equates the value of marginal product across markets is also the 
sorting that leads to an efficient allocation of labour resources. 
35 
 
However, the single equilibrium wage in the labour market relies on the assumption that all 
jobs are alike and all workers are alike across sectors. This is not true in the reality. Usually, 
the existence of the public sector is to provide public goods and services, which would not be 
provided efficiently in the private sector markets due to market failure (e.g. imperfect compe-
tition, externalities and asymmetric information). This is why the “invisible hand” (the market 
force) should be complemented by the “visible hand” (the government).  
As Adam Smith pointed out, job attributes (the demand side) and the individual characteristics 
(the supply side) will lead to different wages. It is not the monetary wage that is equated across 
jobs in a competitive market, but the “whole of the advantages and disadvantages” of the job 
(The Wealth of Nations, 1776). These two sets of variables act as shifting factors of the labour 
supply curve and labour demand curve, resulting in different wages.  
As illustrated in Figure 7, assume that the overall market equilibrium is ?̅? where the aggregate 
labour supply curve (𝑆) and the aggregate labour demand curve (𝐷) meets. For different indi-
viduals and different jobs, there are some specific factors shifting the two curves to 𝑆𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖, 
resulting in a specific equilibrium wage 𝑤𝑖 for each individual/job. 
 
Figure 7 Wage Differentials due to Shifting Factors in the Labour Market 
To see if there is any wage differentials between the public and private sectors, we need to take 
into account the two class of factors that contribute to the wage differentials apart from working 
in the public sector. Some of them are justified such as education level (individual characteris-
tics on the supply side) and riskiness (job attributes on the demand side), but others may not be 
justified discriminations such as race and gender—if we believe that race and gender are not 
correlated with productivity.  
wage 
hour 
𝑆 
𝑆𝑖 𝐷𝑖 
𝐷 
?̅? 
𝑤𝑖 
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The econometric model of the wage determination is implied from the neoclassical labour eco-
nomic theory above. The dependent variable ln 𝑤𝑖 (log of hourly wage) depends on the follow-
ing two sets of regressors: 
 Individual Characteristics (supply side): gender, race, marital status, sex orientation, 
age, age squared, migrant, work experience, work experience squared and education. 
 Job Attributes (demand side): work mode (full-time or part-time), London dummy, 
industry dummies (SIC), occupation dummies (OCC), job type (manual work dummy) 
and sector dummy. 
Note that the sector dummy (“whether the job is in the public sector”) is the key regressor in 
the model, and the ultimate purpose is to estimate the effect of this dummy variable—the PSWP. 
1.2 The Econometric Model of Sector Choice 
In the competitive labour market, which sector an individual chooses to work for depends on 
which sector gives a higher utility. To be consistent with the neoclassical model in the previous 
subsection, it is straightforward to conclude that if all the individual characteristics and job 
attributes are exactly the same, then the individual should be indifferent between working in 
the public sector and the private sector, because the competitive equilibrium wage and working 
hours must be equalised, so is the utility which is a function of wage and working hours. 
Therefore, any preference of one sector over the other must be due to the differences either in 
the individual characteristics or in the job attributes. Since the dependent variable to be ex-
plained is a dummy variable (“whether the job is in the public sector”), we can use either probit 
or logit function form. Given the similarity between the results, we will stick to logit in all the 
analysis below due to its lighter computational burden. 
2 Results 
In this section, we are going to apply all the aforementioned four types of methods in the ex-
isting literature to provide a robust estimate for the PSWP in the UK. Only two representative 
techniques within each type are used. Others are omitted either because they give similar results 
(e.g. Daymont-Andrisani decomposition, Terrell decomposition) or because some required 
data are not available (e.g. IV). 
2.1 Type 1: Single-Equation-Regression Method 
This type of method essentially uses the public sector dummy (𝐷𝑖) to control for the sector 
wage differential in the intercept. Figure 8 shows the OLS estimates of the PSWP in contrast 
with the raw wage differential, and Figure 9 is based on the subsamples by gender. 
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Figure 8 OLS Estimates of the PSWP (Pooled Sample) 
The PSWP exists even after controlling for all the differences in individual characteristics and 
job attributes. This is true for both male and female workers, but female workers tend to enjoy 
a higher PSWP. This finding is consistent with the literature (Dolton and Makepeace, 2011; 
Blackaby et al, 2012). Over the first decade of the 21st century, the wage premium is quite 
stable. One interesting implication is that, although the raw wage differential suggests that 
working in the public sector is more and more privileged after the financial crisis (an increasing 
PSWP after 2008), the OLS estimates suggest a much weaker trend and even a drop in 2011. 
 
Figure 9 OLS Estimates of the PSWP by Gender 
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Figure 10 Quantile Regression Estimates of the PSWP (Pooled Sample) 
The OLS tells the difference in mean, but it is usually criticised to be sensitive to outliers. As 
shown in the descriptive statistics in CHAPTER II, the distribution of wage is indeed quite 
skewed, and there are many very high and very low wages in the data. To deal with this problem, 
we also conduct the quantile regressions and contrast it with the median wage premium. 
 
Figure 11 Quantile Regression Estimates of the PSWP by Gender 
It is obvious that the median PSWP (around 16%) is remarkably higher than the mean PSWP 
(around 7%), but the quantile regression estimates at median are quite similar to those in OLS 
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(around 8%). This finding suggests that the median of sector wage differential is not a good 
measure of the average PSWP, but the quantile regression confirms the robustness of the OLS 
results. Also, the females benefit more from working in the public sector than males, but the 
estimated median PSWP is narrower than the estimated mean PSWP. 
2.2 Type 2: Decomposition-Based Method 
We use the same model specification to apply the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The pre-
dicted PSWP estimated based on the two subsamples is decomposed into two components: (i) 
the component due to the differences in coefficients, and (ii) the component due to the differ-
ences in endowments. 
As shown in Figure 12, the predicted PSWP is kept above 10% since 2001, and keeps rising 
after the financial crisis. The main reason for a rising PSWP is the rising contribution of the 
component due to differences in coefficients. The slight drop in the coefficient component in 
2011 is in line with the findings in type 1 methods. 
 
Figure 12 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of PSWP 
To be fully comparable to the type 1 methods in the last subsection, the JMP decomposition is 
also conducted based on the predicted median wage premium. The raw PSWP is therefore 
decomposed into three components: (i) the component due to the differences in observed 
“prices” (coefficients), (ii) the component due to the observed “quantities” (endowments), and 
(iii) the component due to the differences in unobserved prices or quantities. 
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Figure 13 shows the JMP decomposition on the median of the raw PSWP, which is again higher 
than the mean as before. However, the contribution of the differences in coefficients is signif-
icantly less than the evidence found based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, although the 
rising trend of this component is still maintained. Note that the unexplained component is not 
accounting for much of the wage premium. 
 
Figure 13 JMP Decomposition of PSWP 
2.3 Type 3: Matching-Based Method 
Different from the decomposition-based method whereby the wage determination equation is 
explicitly specified, the matching-based method instead spells out the sector choice equation. 
The sector choice equation is derived from the rational worker’s utility maximisation problem, 
but the implied econometric model is not necessarily correct in specification. It is because the 
“treatment” equation (i.e. the sector choice equation) only serves as a matching criterion to link 
individuals with their counterparts in the other sector. The PSM method applied in this paper 
is based on Edwin and Babara (2003). 
Figure 14 shows the results of the estimated average treatment effects (ATE) and those for the 
untreated (ATU) and the treated (ATT). The ATT tends to be higher than the ATU, which 
makes sense because whoever chooses to work in the public sector tends to be those who ben-
efit the most. Those who could have earned more if they switch from private sector to public 
sector may suffer from the excess labour supply in the public sector labour market, similar to 
the “queuing model” in Venti (1987). This is actually contrary to the assumed Neoclassical 
model, where market always clear. 
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Figure 14 Estimated Treatment Effects using PSM 
 
Figure 15 Distribution of Propensity Score (2011) 
One problem with PSM is that the distributions of propensity score between public sector and 
private sector are substantially different. That causes the common support problem in matching. 
For example, Figure 15 graphs the propensity score histogram by treatment status for the year 
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2011. The distribution of propensity score for those who are working in public sector (the 
treated group) are more skewed towards 1, while the distribution for those who are working in 
private sector (the untreated group) are more skewed towards 0. Ramoni-Perazzi and Bellante 
(2006) also find that the data is too heterogeneous to be used to compare wages across sectors 
based on PSM. 
As a robustness check, the NNM is also conducted and shown in Figure 16. The NNM method 
is very similar to PSM, so are the estimation results. Note that the ATU is even lower under 
NNM algorithm, and sometimes it is negative. That means people would be better off if they 
stay in the private sector, and this supports the rational optimisation behaviour in the sector 
choice model. 
There is a common feature in both PSM and NNM—the ATU is especially high right after the 
financial crisis (i.e. 2009). This implies a nonpecuniary benefit of working in the public sector, 
the job security and wage stability. During the recession, the private sector tends to have higher 
chance to dismiss employees and those who stay usually face pay cuts. In the contrary, the 
PSWP tends to be lower during the booms, because private sector is more driven by profit 
maximisation and wage is more flexible due to incentive pay scheme. The PSWP is counter-
cyclical and can be used as an indicator of the business cycles. The hypothesis of a negative 
correlation between the business cycles and the PSWP is formally tested in the next section. 
 
Figure 16 Estimated Treatment Effects using NNM 
43 
 
2.4 Type 4: Multiple-Equation-Regression Method 
Following Gronau (1974), Lewis (1974) and Heckman (1976, 1979), the Heckman selection 
model becomes the most influential method to resolve the selection bias problem in microe-
conometric literature. This is essentially a multiple-equation-regression method, because it in-
volves explicitly specifying both the wage determination equation (the “outcome equation”) 
and the sector choice equation (the “selection equation”), so it combines the features of single-
equation-regression method, decomposition-based method and the matching-based method 
into one system. 
The selection equation is specified as a probit model using the econometric model developed 
in 1.2. After that, we calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio (𝜆𝑖) according to the formula below, and 
then include it as an extra regressor in the wage determination equation. 
Selection Equation:    
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Outcome Equation: 2
ˆˆ
i i i iy    β x  
This is done for both pooled sample and the separate samples by gender, and the estimated 
coefficient 𝛿 over time is shown in Figure 17. As mentioned previously, the inverse Mill’s ratio 
is not exactly the same as the sector dummy 𝐷𝑖, and the interpretation of the coefficient 𝛿 is 
not exactly the same as the public sector wage premium. The inclusion of ?̂?𝑖 is mainly to correct 
for the selection bias (or endogeneity bias due to the omitted variable), rather than estimating 
the PSWP. Nevertheless, the trend of 𝛿 is similar to the estimated PSWP in other methods. 
 
Figure 17 Estimated Coefficient of Inverse Mill’s Ratio using Heckman Selection Model 
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Figure 18 Estimated Treatment Effects using Endogenous Treatment Effects Model 
Similarly, the endogenous treatment effects model is estimated using both pooled sample and 
separate sample by gender (Figure 18). The estimated ATE is more volatile than the other 
methods, but stylised fact that females enjoy a higher “treatment effect” (i.e. PSWP) is well 
maintained. 
As argued in CHAPTER I, there is a vital drawback of the multiple-equation-regression method, 
i.e. any mis-specification in one of the equations will contaminate the whole system. The mis-
specification bias may be more serious than the consequence due to selection bias. As a result, 
we only use type 4 method to provide a robustness check, without placing too much attention 
to the magnitudes of the estimates. 
To smooth the estimates over time, we take average of the estimated PSWP over the 11 sample 
years (2001-2011). They are compared in the bar chart below. Different methods give different 
magnitudes ranging from 3.43% (JMP) to 10% (treatment effects). Every method has its ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Taking into account all these estimates, the average estimate for 
the PSWP is around 6.5%. 
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Figure 19 Summary of the Estimated PSWP (Average over Time) 
3 From Microdata to Macrodata 
We have seen from the time path of the estimated PSWP and one remarkable feature is its 
relationship over the business cycles. It is reasonable to conjecture that the PSWP is negatively 
correlated to the business cycle, because the wage in the public sector is less cyclical. 
To verify this hypothesis, the real GDP of the UK during this period is decomposed into the 
cyclical component and trend component using Hodrick-Prescott filter, and the percentage de-
viation of the cycles from the trend are used to measure the business cycles (sometimes called 
the “output gap” in the macroeconomic literature). Figure 21 contrasts this measure of business 
cycles with the estimated PSWP. 
A simple eyeballing suggests that, during the booms (2001-2007), the PSWP tends to drop, 
while during the recession (2008-2011), the PSWP trends up. To formally test the hypothesis 
of negative relationship, the correlation coefficients are estimated between the output gap and 
each estimated PSWP. The conclusion confirms the conjecture: all estimated PSWP have neg-
ative correlation coefficients with the output gap. 
This implication is very informative for macroeconomic modelling, because it links the micro-
data evidence with the macrodata evidence. It can be used to incorporate both theoretical and 
empirical microfoundations into the macroeconomic models with two-sector labour market. A 
model allowing for heterogeneous agents is usually more powerful in explaining the persis-
tence of the business cycles. 
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Figure 20 Correlation Coefficients between the PSWP and the Business Cycles 
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Figure 21 The Relationship between the PSWP and the Business Cycles 
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4 Conclusion 
To summarise, the four types of econometric modelling methods give qualitatively similar re-
sults of the PSWP in the UK over the first decade of 21st century. There are four stylised facts:  
(i) There is a positive PSWP (an average estimate is around 6.5%). 
(ii) The females enjoy a higher PSWP than males. 
(iii) The observed raw PSWP is mainly due to the coefficient differences across sectors, 
especially after the financial crisis. 
(iv) The fluctuations of PSWP over time is negatively correlated with the macroeco-
nomic business cycles (around -0.24). 
The first two stylised facts are in line with the existing literature in PSWP based on the earlier 
datasets and the other countries. The latter two are newly identified by this paper. 
Methodologically speaking, though OLS is subject to selection bias or endogeneity bias, it 
actually gives the most stable and therefore more reliable estimates. The Blinder-Oaxaca de-
composition and propensity score matching seem to give the estimates closest to the average, 
while the multiple-equation-regression results are much more volatile. As argued earlier, the 
bias due to mis-specification may be more serious than that due to selection bias or endogeneity 
bias. 
In CHAPTER IV that follows, we are going to develop a new approach to testing and estimat-
ing the microfounded theoretical economic model. It is also capable of testing if there is selec-
tion bias or endogeneity bias problem within the same methodology. 
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CHAPTER IV: ECONOMIC MODELLING METHODS 
This chapter applies the II tests and estimation described in CHAPTER I, built on the econo-
metric modelling methods conducted in CHAPTER III. 
1 The Model 
The model is microfounded based on a simple neoclassical labour market framework. The rep-
resentative worker maximises utility subject to a budget constraint and a time constraint (the 
supply side of the labour market), while the representative firm maximises profit subject to a 
technology constraint (the demand side of the labour market). The labour market clears with a 
market-agreed wage (price of labour) and working hours (quantity of labour). 
1.1 The Supply Side 
The representative worker faces the following standard optimisation problem: 
 
1 1 1
, ,
max ,
s
s s s
s s
C X L
U C X C X
   
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 
, subject to: 
Budget Constraint: C wL ; 
Time Constraint: X L T  . 
For simplicity, the utility function is assumed to be constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
with the elasticity equal to 𝑠. There are two utility inputs, consumption 𝐶 and leisure 𝑋, and 
the relative utility weight on leisure is 𝛼. The budget constraint is expressed in real terms, so 
𝑤𝐿 is real wage income. The time endowment 𝑇 is allocated between leisure 𝑋 and labour 𝐿. 
If the two constraints are substituted into the utility function, then the optimisation problem 
with constraints become one without, and only one control variable is left: 
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The first order condition is obtained by taking derivative with respect to 𝐿, leading to the in-
tratemporal condition—the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is 
equal to the real wage: 
1
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This is the marginal condition for the representative worker, so it is satisfied by all observations 
only when the workers are homogenous. In reality, individual characteristics, such as age, gen-
der, race and education, are all different across individual workers. It is assumed that the wages 
and hours we observed among the individuals are all market-agreed amounts taking into ac-
count of these individual characteristics. When labour market clears, the marginal condition 
above only holds for the very marginal ones, and the other individual workers enjoy some 
positive surplus over the market-agreed wages. Thus, the wages and hours we observed in the 
data do not exactly satisfy the marginal condition for the representative worker. Instead, the 
derived marginal condition of wage above is like a lower bound, and the actual condition for 
each individual should be an inequality: 
1
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To make the condition an equation, a supply-side surplus term 𝑆𝑖 is needed to include the ef-
fects of individual characteristics: 
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  ...(1) 
The surplus term 𝑆𝑖 can be interpreted as an exogenous shock or error term similar to those in 
a macroeconomic DSGE model. Usually, these shocks are not identically and independently 
distributed (IID) and are assumed to have an ARMA structure to generate a white noise inno-
vation (Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007). In a similar logic, we can break this exogenous supply 
shock 𝑆𝑖 into a deterministic component capturing the differences in individual characteristics 
and a stochastic component 𝜀𝑖
𝑆, supposedly to be IID:  
   exp exp Si S i iS S   η ind  
The specification is chosen to be exponential so that the coefficients can be interpreted as elas-
ticities. Take natural logarithms on both hand sides of this equation: 
 ln ln Si S i iS S   η ind , where  2~ 0,Si SIID     ...(2) 
Here, 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖  is a vector of individual characteristics as used in the econometric modelling 
method, such as age, gender, race and education, and 𝛈𝐒 is the coefficient vector of each term 
inside 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖. The innovation term 𝜀𝑖
𝑆 is supposed to be an IID random variable under the null 
hypothesis (there is no selection bias, or equivalently there is no endogeneity bias), so 𝜀𝑖
𝑆 is 
uncorrelated with the terms of 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖. 
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1.2 The Demand Side 
A representative firm faces the following standard optimisation problem: 
,
max
Y L
Y wL   , subject to: 
Technology Constraint: Y AL . 
𝐴 is to capture the average total factor productivity level in the production function. This paper 
focuses on the labour market, so capital is treated as given in the production function, and it is 
absorbed into 𝐴.4 Substitute the constraint into the objective function, and the optimisation 
problem becomes: 
max
L
AL wL    
The first order condition with respect to 𝐿 is the standard marginal condition for a firm—mar-
ginal product of labour equals to marginal cost of labour: 
1w AL   
Again, this is the marginal condition for the representative firm or job, so it holds for all obser-
vations only when we have homogenous jobs. In reality, job attributes, such as industry, sector, 
occupation, work mode and location, are all different across jobs. It is again assumed that the 
wages and hours we observed among the individuals are all market-agreed amounts taking into 
account of these job attributes. When labour market clears, the marginal condition above only 
holds for the very marginal ones, and the other firms enjoy some positive surplus over the 
market-agreed wages. Therefore, the derived marginal condition of wage on the demand side 
is like an upper bound, and the actual condition for each job should be an inequality: 
1
i iw AL
   
To make the condition an equation, a demand-side surplus term (𝐷𝑖) is needed to include the 
effects of job attributes: 
 1i i iw D AL
    ...(3) 
Similar to the supply-side surplus, the exogenous error term 𝐷𝑖 can also be further decomposed 
into a constant component, a job attributes component and an IID innovation: 
                                                          
4 To see how capital is implicitly included in the model, note that the production function 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐿𝛾  can be 
treated as a short-run case with fixed capital (𝐾) of 𝑌 = ?̃?𝐿𝛾𝐾1−𝛾. If 𝐾 = 𝐾, the production function becomes 
𝑌 = (?̃?𝐾1−𝛾)𝐿𝛾  with 𝐴 ≡ ?̃?𝐾1−𝛾.  
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   exp exp Di D i iD D   η job  
Here, 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖 is a vector of job attributes, such as industry, sector, occupation, work mode and 
location, and 𝛈𝐷 is the coefficient vector of each term of 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖. In particular, one of the variables 
in 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖 is the public sector dummy, i.e. whether the job is in public sector or private sector. 
Take natural logarithms to rewrite this equation into a regression-like model: 
 ln ln Di D i iD D   η job , where  2~ 0,Di DIID    ...(4) 
1.3 Market Equilibrium 
If the labour market clears, the supply of a particular sort of labour 𝐿𝑖 is equal to the demand 
for it. To summarise, equation (1) and equation (3) describe the equilibrium5.  
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There are two endogenous variables in this system, the real wage 𝑤𝑖 and the working hours 𝐿𝑖, 
and there are two exogenous variables, 𝑆𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖, which are further modelled by two general-
ised linear regressions (2) and (4).  
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The individual characteristics 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖  and job attributes 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖  are actually the regressors in the 
econometric modelling method. Let’s term them as “conditioning variables”. Note that the 𝛈’s 
in the two equations are not exactly the same as the regression coefficients. The strict interpre-
tation of 𝛈𝑆 is the “elasticities of supply-side surplus with respect to individual characteristics”, 
and that of 𝛈𝐷 is the “elasticities of demand-side surplus with respect to job attributes”. In 
contrast, the 𝛃 in the econometric models in the last CHAPTER are the elasticities of wage. 
The surplus is only a part of wage. Accordingly, there are two innovations (regression error 
terms), 𝜀𝑖
𝑆  and 𝜀𝑖
𝐷 , respectively describing the idiosyncratic disturbances on the supply-side 
surplus and demand-side surplus. Again, they are different from the error terms in the regres-
sions. In fact, the error term should be a function of the two innovations.  
Another point to be stressed is that the “intensive margin” must not to be confused with the 
“extensive margin” (Hansen, 1985). In our model, the focus is on the former, i.e. the working 
                                                          
5 Note that this is a partial equilibrium in the labour market, not a general equilibrium of the whole macroecon-
omy, so it does not require the clearance of goods market. 
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hours, rather than the participation decision—whether or not to work at all. This feature of our 
model on “intensive margin” is desirable because it matches the microdata at hand. 
1.4 Solution Method 
Note that in general there is no analytical solution to this nonlinear equation system, but there 
are two methods to deal with this problem. 
First, note that in a special case 𝑠 = 1 which actually implies a Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
the reduced form of this equation system can be solved analytically: 
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One remarkable feature of the reduced form is that the equilibrium working hour 𝐿𝑖 does not 
depend on the total factor productivity 𝐴 (but varies due to the different individual character-
istics 𝑆𝑖), which is a typical feature in neoclassical models. It is because a change in productiv-
ity will lead to both substitution effect and income effect, which offset each other perfectly (see 
the illustration of Figure 22). The original production function (blue dash) shifts out to the 
higher level (bold blue dash) due to a higher productivity, and we can construct a hypothetical 
production function (black dotted) with the new productivity level but tangent to the original 
utility level. 
 
Figure 22 The Perfect Offset between Income Effect and Substitution Effect (𝑠 = 1) 
54 
 
In general when 𝑠 ≠ 1, however, the nonlinear equation system (1) and (3), or equivalently the 
consolidated equation (5), does not have analytical solution.  
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  ...(5) 
One possibility is to use a numerical method (e.g. Newton-Raphson algorithm) to solve for 𝑤𝑖 
and 𝐿𝑖. Nevertheless, despite that the numerical method is not very difficult to solve the non-
linear equation system once, it will induce an extremely heavy computation burden due to the 
simulation of the II procedures. To see this, consider a particular simulation in the II test pro-
cedure, there will be about 7,000 observations to be solved (each observation 𝑖 implies a non-
linear equation system). For a typical II test, we usually run 1,000 simulations, so there will be 
7,000,000 nonlinear equation systems to be solved for one test. Even if it only takes 1 second 
for each solution, it will take about 81 days to finish one test. Let alone the II estimation, which 
involves at least several thousands of II tests. 
Alternatively, we can linearise the equation system around some point and then solve the linear 
equation analytically. A straightforward choice for the expansion point is the average wage of 
the whole sample, on the basis that the individual equilibrium should not be too far away from 
the population equilibrium. 
 
Figure 23 Linear Approximation of the Equilibrium 
Figure 23 illustrates the linear approximation of the solution of the nonlinear equation system, 
built on Figure 7. The aggregate/average labour demand curve (𝐷) and labour supply (𝑆) inter-
sect at the market equilibrium wage (?̅?), which is observable in the data. For each specific 
wage 
hour 
𝑆 
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individual/job, due to shifting factors captured by 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖 and 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖, the specific equilibrium wage 
(𝑤𝑖) will be different. To solve this specific wage, we expand the supply curve and demand 
curve at ?̅?, ending up with the linearised supply “curve” (𝑆𝑖
′) and demand “curve” (𝐷𝑖
′). The 
approximate solution 𝑤𝑖
′ is very easy to obtain because the nonlinear equation system is now a 
linear equation system. The closer are 𝑤𝑖 and ?̅?, the closer are the approximate solution 𝑤𝑖
′ 
and the true solution 𝑤𝑖.This linearisation method is a special case of local approximation, 
which is widely used in the macroeconomic DSGE literature. Its counterpart in the dynamic 
stochastic model setting is called perturbation method, see for example Uhlig (1998) for more 
details. 
To summarise, there are two methods to solve the nonlinear equation system: 
A. parameter restriction to make it analytically solvable; 
B. local approximation of nonlinear equation system to linear equation system. 
Arguably, the local approximation method is more general because not all economic models 
have unique analytical solutions, and the restriction of parameter values may not be reasonable. 
In contrast, for any model, the average wage (or any other endogenous variables) always exists, 
so linear approximation always works. Its disadvantage is also clear, because the approximate 
solution may lie very far away from the true solution due to the high degree of nonlinearity. 
Therefore, we will focus on method (B) in this paper, while method (A) is equivalent to method 
(B) if the estimated 𝑠 is equal to 1. 
2 Application of Indirect Inference 
The structural form of the model 𝑓(𝐲, 𝐳, 𝛉) = 0 is just the two equations derived from the mar-
ginal conditions (1) and (3), or equivalently the condensed equation (5) or the linearised form 
of it. Using the notation introduced in CHAPTER I, the endogenous variables 𝐲𝑖 are 𝑤𝑖 and 𝐿𝑖, 
while the exogenous variables 𝐳𝑖 include both 𝑆𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖, which in turn depend on the condi-
tioning variables 𝐱𝑖 (𝐢𝐧𝐝𝑖 and 𝐣𝐨𝐛𝑖) and the two IID innovations 𝛆 (𝜀𝑖
𝑆 and 𝜀𝑖
𝐷). The structural 
parameter 𝛉 comprises 𝛼, 𝑠, 𝛾 and 𝐴. In principle, the shock structure parameters, i.e. 𝛈𝑆, 𝛈𝐷, 
𝜎𝑆 and 𝜎𝑆, are also part of 𝛉. To reduce the dimensionality of the parameters to be estimated, 
we set them to the OLS estimates. 
The data is 11 years’ cross-section. For simplicity, we only focus on the latest year (2011), but 
the same procedure can be used for all years. The common sample size includes 6,216 obser-
vations with a mean wage of £12 per hour and a mean working hour of 34 hours a week. 
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2.1 Calibration 
To initiate the II test and estimation, we need to calibrate the parameters either using the liter-
ature convention or using the data averages consistent with the model. Since there is no micro-
economic literature on these structural parameters, the macroeconomic literature is used for the 
calibration purpose. For example, the utility share of leisure6 𝛼 can be set at 0.5 and the con-
stant elasticity of substitution 𝑠 can be set at 0.5 to allow for greater complementarity than 
substitutability between consumption and leisure. The income share of labour in the production 
function 𝛾 is usually estimated to be 0.6~0.8 in the macroeconomic literature (e.g. Smets and 
Wouters, 2007), so we set it as 0.7. Finally, the total factor productivity 𝐴 can be calculated 
from the firm’s marginal condition and the known parameters and average values of the en-
dogenous variables: 
1 0.7 112 0.7 34 49w AL A A          
The calibrated structural parameters give the initial values 𝛉0 = [0.5; 0.5; 0.7; 49] of the vec-
tor 𝛉 = [𝛼; 𝑠; 𝛾; 𝐴]. 
A warning over this calibration strategy is due here. The microdata may exhibit very different 
parameter values from those implied from the macrodata, especially when the aggregate mac-
roeconomic data cover the whole economy, while our microdata are heavily concentrated in 
the service sectors. Therefore, this calibration practice is only done to initiate and illustrate the 
II test. A more formal II estimation procedure will be done in the next section to provide a more 
robust conclusion. 
2.2 The Hypotheses 
The null hypothesis (H0) is that the economic model is the true data generating process. Under 
this null, we have two further possibilities7: 
 H0a: The model is true and 𝐱𝑖 and 𝛆𝑖 are uncorrelated (i.e. there is no selection bias). 
 H0b: The model is true and 𝐱𝑖 and 𝛆𝑖 are correlated (i.e. there is selection bias). 
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (H1) is that “the economic model is false”, and there is 
no point discussing if there is selection bias. The economic model can be true or false according 
to the chosen II criterion, and selection bias (or interpreted as endogeneity bias) can exist, so 
there are four possible combinations: 
                                                          
6 This is based on a textbook written by Gillman (2011). 
7 See appendix for the details of the indirect inference test on selection bias. 
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 The model is true The model is false 
No selection bias 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑎 = min(𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑎, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑏) ≤ 𝑐 𝑐 < min(𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑎, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑏) 
Selection bias 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑏 = min(𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑎, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑏) ≤ 𝑐 𝑐 < min(𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑎, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑏) 
Notes: 𝑐 is the critical value corresponding to the 95% p-value of the 𝜒2 distribution. 
It would be straightforward if we have concluded a false model or a true model with no selec-
tion bias. The tricky one is the case of true model with selection bias. In this case, some omitted 
conditioning variables are correlated with the error terms, either the specification of the model 
needs to be revised (e.g. Heckman) or the estimation method needs to be updated (e.g. IV). 
2.3 The Auxiliary Model 
In the application of II procedure, the choice of auxiliary model is vital for II. As mentioned in 
CHAPTER I, the auxiliary model does not have to be correctly specified, because it is merely 
a way of summarising the data feature. However, if it is correctly specified, then the estimates 
are consistent and asymptotically converging the maximum likelihood estimates (Gourieroux 
et al, 1993). To build connections with the previous CHAPTER, all four types of econometric 
modelling methods are used to extract the information on PSWP from both actual data and 
simulated data. To keep the argument succinct, only one representative technique in each type 
is used: type 1 (linear regression model, OLS), type 2 (Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, BOD), 
type 3 (propensity score matching, PSM) and type 4 (Heckman selection model, HSM). The 
corresponding auxiliary parameter vector (𝛝) is respectively: 
 Type 1 (OLS): the 35 coefficients of the linear regression model. 
 Type 2 (BOD): wage differentials due to different (i) coefficients and (ii) endowments. 
 Type 3 (PSM): the treatment effects of (i) the treated and (ii) the untreated. 
 Type 4 (HSM): the 35 coefficients of the outcome equation of Heckman model. 
It is implied by a series of studies that the power of the II test is lower when the dimension of 
the auxiliary parameter vector is smaller (Meenagh et al, 2009; Minford et al 2015). In our case, 
type 1 and type 4 have very big number of auxiliary parameters to be matched between the 
actual data and the simulated data. II tests based on type 1 and type 4 auxiliary models are 
arguably more powerful than type 2 and type 3, each of which only has two auxiliary parame-
ters. However, type 2 and type 3 provide a more detailed and informative way of analysing the 
PSWP, but type 1 and type 4 models place too much weights on irrelevant information of the 
data other than PSWP (only one of the 35 coefficients). Thus, there seems to be a trade-off 
between the power of the test and the usefulness of the test. 
To accommodate this trade-off, we propose an eclectic approach in order to maintain a rela-
tively high power of the II test while raising the importance of PSWP in the auxiliary parameter 
vector. We name it Grouped OLS (GOLS) or type 5, but it is actually a variant of type 1. This 
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is done by grouping the 35 coefficients of OLS regression into 8 categories, one of which is 
the PSWP. The details of the grouping is shown in Table 3. 
 Grouped 𝛝 OLS Regressors 
 𝜗1: Intercept intercept 
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𝜗2: Demographic 
male 
white 
married 
homosexual 
age 
age2 
migrant 
𝜗3: Experience 
work experience 
work experience2 
𝜗4: Education 
low education 
GCSE 
A-level 
higher education 
degree 
J
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b
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tt
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𝜗5: Temporospatical 
full time 
London 
𝜗6: Industry 
energy & water 
manufacturing 
construction 
distribution 
transport 
banking 
public admin 
other services 
𝜗7: Occupation 
professional 
technical 
administrative 
skilled trades 
personal service 
customer service 
processing 
elementary 
manual job 
𝜗8: PSWP public sector dummy 
Table 3 The Grouped Auxiliary Parameters of Type 5 Auxiliary Model 
The grouped auxiliary parameters are basically the arithmetic average of the underlying coef-
ficients of the OLS regression (type 1). Since the estimated coefficients of the original regres-
sors are normally distributed asymptotically, the average (a linear combination) of them is also 
normally distributed. By doing this grouping, the dimensionality of the auxiliary parameter 
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vector has been greatly reduced to emphasise the focus of the model—the PSWP, with a mild 
sacrifice of the power. A Monte Carlo simulation can be done in the future to quantify the 
decrease in power of the test due to this reduction in the dimensionality from 35 to 8, but this 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2.4 Procedure 
Following CHAPTER I and the discussion above, the technical procedures of II test in this 
context are summarised as follows: 
Step 1: Given the initial parameter values 𝛉0 and the actual observed endogenous var-
iables 𝐲𝑖 ≡ [𝑤𝑖; 𝐿𝑖], calculate the exogenous variables/shocks 𝐳𝑖 ≡ [𝑆𝑖; 𝐷𝑖] for each ob-
servation 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 based on the structural equation (1) and (3), or just (5). 
Step 2: Regress the calculated 𝐳𝑖 on the conditioning variables 𝐱𝑖 and obtain the elas-
ticities vectors 𝛈𝑆 and 𝛈𝐷 as well as the innovations 𝛆𝑖 ≡ [𝜀𝑖
𝑆; 𝜀𝑖
𝐷] for each observation 
𝑖. Then we have the actual conditioning variable vector (𝐱(𝑎)) and innovation vector 
(𝛆(𝑎)) based on equation (2) and (4). 
Step 3: Bootstrap 𝑆 = 1000  sets of both 𝐱(𝑠)  and 𝛆(𝑠)  from the actual counterparts 
(𝐱(𝑎) and 𝛆(𝑎)) under both H0a and H0b, where 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆. Under H0a, the bootstrap 
is done independently on 𝐱(𝑎) and 𝛆(𝑎), while under H0b, the bootstrap is done by bun-
dling8 the public sector dummy with the innovation for each observation. 
Step 4: Run auxiliary regression (type 1-type 5) for the 1 + 𝑆 sets of data, including 1 
actual dataset and  𝑆 simulated datasets. 
Step 5: Calculate the Wald statistics and p-values for both H0a and H0b, based on 
which the conclusion is drawn. 
The whole II test procedure is dependent of the structural parameter vector 𝛉0. The auxiliary 
parameters are 𝛝(𝑎) and 𝛝(𝑠), with the latter also depending on 𝛉0. Therefore the Wald statis-
tics basically depend on 𝛉0. For a different set of values of 𝛉, there might be different conclu-
sions. Thus, to push the explanation power of the model to the limit, we use global optimisation 
algorithms to search for the best parameter values ?̂? which can minimise the Wald statistics 
under both H0a and H0b. 
Note that the computational costs become substantial if any step during the 𝑆 simulation in-
volves numerical solution. This is indeed the case for both propensity score matching and 
                                                          
8 By bundling, we are effectively bootstrapping the vector of [𝐱; 𝛆], rather than 𝐱 and 𝛆 separately. In this way, 
we actually impose correlations between them, indicating the existence of selection bias (endogeneity). 
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Heckman selection model, where a generalised linear regression model has to be estimated 
using maximum likelihood via numerical optimisation. For each simulation (out of 1000), there 
is one Newton-Raphson conducted to maximise the nonlinear likelihood function. 
This is marginally acceptable9 for II testing, but it would be impossibly costly for II estimation. 
Therefore, we will omit Type 3 and Type 4 in the next section when we try to estimate the four 
structural parameters using the global optimisation algorithm, which usually involves thou-
sands of tests (if we are lucky to achieve convergence by then). 
3 II Test Results 
The simulation in II test begins with obtaining the innovations (𝜀𝑖
𝑆, 𝜀𝑖
𝐷) from the implied exog-
enous variables (𝑆𝑖, 𝐷𝑖) based on the structural equations (1) and (3). They are supposed to be 
IID across individual observations (similar to the requirement of white noise process in the 
time-series context). However, there are two structural innovations, and they might be corre-
lated with each other in a joint distribution. 
3.1 The Innovations 
The extracted innovations from the structural equation are apparently jointly distributed as 
shown in Figure 24 (Figure 25 is the implied bivariate normal distribution). The estimated 
standard deviations of the two innovations are respectively 𝜎𝑆 = 0.7475 and 𝜎𝐷 = 0.4204, 
suggesting a much bigger heterogeneity on the supply side (workers) than that on the demand 
side (jobs). The correlation coefficient between the two innovations is 0.2183, which is signif-
icant at the 1% level. The implied variance-covariance matrix is: 
0.5588 0.0686
0.0686 0.1767
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A non-zero correlation means that, during the bootstrapping, the innovations need to be drawn 
jointly rather than independently, regardless of whether there is selection bias. Similarly, there 
are significant correlations between conditioning variables, and the bootstrapping cannot ig-
nore that either. A simple solution to the dependent resampling is to bundle all the dependent 
variables for each observation. Bundling can maintain the observed correlations between the 
dependent variables in bootstrapping, but the sample variation will be greatly reduced. 
An alternative resampling strategy is to use Monte Carlo simulation rather than bootstrapping. 
The advantage of Monte Carlo is that it can generate new possible observations while main-
taining the dependence between variables. However, the problem is that it involves another 
                                                          
9 On an average desktop, it takes about 20 minutes for each test of type 3 and type 4. 
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estimation procedure before the simulation, so there might be more errors accumulated. For 
example, if we compare Figure 24 and Figure 25, we find that the estimated multivariate normal 
distribution is “over-smoothed” compared to the observed distribution. Following the conven-
tion in the II literature, we adopt the bootstrapping resampling in this paper. 
 
Figure 24 Joint Frequency Distribution of the Innovations 
 
Figure 25 Implied Joint Normal Distribution of the Innovations 
3.2 The Wald Statistics 
Based on the bootstrapped innovations, we can simulate 𝑆 datasets under both H0a and H0b. 
All four types of econometric modelling methods are used as the auxiliary regression in the II 
test. The simulated Wald statistics are supposed to follow a 𝜒2 distribution with 𝐾 degrees of 
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freedom, where 𝐾 is the dimension of the auxiliary regression parameter vector (𝛝). If the eco-
nomic model is true, then the corresponding Wald statistic based on the actual data should be 
quite close to 0, indicating that the difference between simulated data feature and the actual 
data feature are very small. Otherwise, if the actual Wald statistic lies at the far right end, e.g. 
to the right of the critical value of 95% percentile, then we will have to reject the model being 
the true data generating process. 
As an illustration, Figure 26 shows the distribution of the Wald statistics based on the 𝑆 sets of 
simulated data using OLS as auxiliary regression. Unfortunately, the actual Wald statistics un-
der both H0a and H0b are far beyond the 95% percentile, so the model is false according to 
this particular auxiliary regression criterion. Note that the distribution of the simulated Wald is 
supposed to be 𝜒2, but as the degree of freedom gets larger (𝐾 = 35 as in Figure 26), it con-
verges in distribution to a normal distribution. 
 
Figure 26 The Distribution of Simulated Wald Statistics (Type 1) 
Among all the five auxiliary regressions, only the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (type 2) and 
the propensity score matching (type 3) can be visualised in a 3D graph, because there are only 
two auxiliary parameters estimated. In the case of BOD (type 2), the PSWP due to different 
coefficients and the pay differential due to different endowments, the joint distribution of which 
is shown in Figure 27. These two parameters are negatively correlated, and the actual auxiliary 
parameters (𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 0.0862 , 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 0.0806) lie outside the 
concentrated area of the distribution mainly due to the failure in matching the component of 
the endowment differences. As for the case of PSM (type 3), the estimated PSWP is different 
for those who work in the public sector, i.e. the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT), 
and for those who work in the private sector, i.e. the average treatment effect for the untreated 
(ATU). The two seem to be positively correlated in the joint distribution (Figure 28), with the 
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actual auxiliary parameters (𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 0.2421, 𝐴𝑇𝑈 = −0.0120) lying right in the most concen-
trated area of the histogram, indicating that the model is very likely to be true. This also makes 
economic sense—people are better off staying in the sector they are currently working in, so 
ATT is positive and ATU is negative. 
 
Figure 27 The Distribution of Wage Differentials following Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
 
Figure 28 The Distribution of Wage Differentials following Propensity Score Matching 
3.3 The Test Conclusions 
Under the initial calibration 𝛉0, the actual Wald statistics, the associated P-values and the crit-
ical values at 5% significance level (C-values) are reported in Table 4. 
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Auxiliary H0a H0b 
Regression Wald C-value P-value Wald C-value P-value 
Type 1: OLS 3453.97 49.53 0.00% 4144.39 49.29 0.00% 
Type 2: BOD 22.04 6.74 0.00% 156.75 6.26 0.00% 
Type 3: PSM 0.91 5.83 63.40% 17.33 6.31 0.02% 
Type 4: HSM 3416.85 49.70 0.00% 3988.66 49.21 0.00% 
Type 5: GOLS 382.84 15.18 0.00% 102.06 15.82 0.00% 
Table 4 II Test under the Initial Calibration 
It is not surprising that a heavily parameterised auxiliary models (such as OLS and HSM, each 
with 35 auxiliary parameters) are imposing a higher bar to pass the model (implying a higher 
power of the tests), because there are more requirements for the model to achieve to be a “true” 
model. In contrast, type 2 and type 3 only have two auxiliary parameters to be compared, so 
the dimension of auxiliary parameters is much smaller and it is much easier for the model to 
pass the test. However, type 2 and type 3 auxiliary models have the advantage of providing 
more detailed information on the PSWP per se, unlike type 1 and type 4 in which only places 
a very small weight on the PSWP feature of the data. Therefore, type 5 is a middle way between 
the two extremes. 
There are two basic conclusions that can be drawn from the II test. First, although both hypoth-
eses are rejected to be the true data generating process in most cases (so there is no point dis-
cussing which one is less false), but we can see that most Wald statistics under H0a are smaller 
than H0b (with an exception for type 5). Second, the only type of auxiliary regression under 
which the model passes is PSM (type 3) under H0a. It implies that the model can offer a very 
good explanation for the PSWP issue we are originally interested in, but may not do a good job 
in matching the other features of the data. 
Is the PSM passing the test by chance, or is there some deeper reason behind this outperfor-
mance? As argued earlier, the propensity score matching only requires a sector choice model, 
and it does not have to be correctly specified, because the probit or logit equation “modelling” 
the probability of choosing public sector is nothing but a way of generating a matching criterion 
between individuals in the two sectors. This is exactly the same logic behind indirect inference 
test—the auxiliary model does not have to be correctly specified and only serves as a compar-
ison “ruler”. This “ruler” may have imprecise measurements, say, stretched somehow, but we 
are using the same ruler to compare both data and the model generated data, so it is a fair 
comparison. This relative robustness exists in both propensity score matching and indirect in-
ference, so it is not good luck to find this result. As shown later, the matching-based method 
always outperforms the other types in indirect inference, even after the model is estimated 
following a different auxiliary regression. 
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4 II Estimation Results 
The economic model is estimated using the genetic algorithm to search globally the best sets 
of values such that the Wald statistics under the two hypotheses are respectively minimised. 
We only adopt the GOLS auxiliary model (type 5) for the estimation purpose because of its 
eclectic advantages of high test power, reasonable weight on PSWP and light computational 
burden. The estimated structural parameters under both null hypotheses are listed in Table 5. 
Structural Parameters 𝛉 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Calibration H0a H0b 
𝛼 Leisure weight 0.1 10 0.50 0.4650 0.4710 
𝑠 Elasticity of Substitution 0.2 1.2 0.70 6.5479 1.1712 
𝛾 Labour Share 0.6 0.95 0.70 0.9366 0.6036 
𝐴 Productivity 24.75 74.24 49.50 56.76 27.21 
 Wald Statistic 4.69 84.25 
 C-Value 15.07 15.69 
 P-Value 79.02% 0.00% 
Table 5 II Estimation of the Structural Parameters under H0 (Type 5) 
It is clear that H0a is favoured against H0b and H1, i.e. the model is very likely to be true and 
there is no evidence for selection bias, with a probability of 79.02%. Therefore, we will just 
focus on the estimates under H0a hereinafter.  
The constant elasticity of substitution, 𝑠, is very high, indicating that the individuals treat con-
sumption and leisure as substitutes more than complements. In a CES utility function, as 𝑠 →
0 the complementarity is greater while as 𝑠 → ∞ the substitutability is greater, with 𝑠 = 1 be-
ing the Cobb-Douglas specification with equal degrees of complementarity and substitutability. 
The II estimate of 𝑠 (6.55 under H0a) is actually at odds with the macroeconomic literature, 
where 𝑠 is usually set close to 1. One reason is the inability of the neoclassical model to capture 
the fluctuations in working hours if 𝑠 → 1 (see Figure 22 for the details). In the macroeconomic 
literature, there are many other complicated mechanisms (e.g. habit persistence, price rigidity 
and adjustment costs as introduced by Christiano et al (2005) into DSGE models) to make up 
for this drawback, but in our simple microeconomic model, the only way to improve the 
model’s ability to generate fluctuations in working hours is to drive 𝑠 away from 1. The higher 
the substitutability, the more widely spread the working hours will be. This is indeed one of 
the limitations of the neoclassical model due to its simplicity. However, even under this simple 
model, it can still pass the test to match a wide range of data features as summarised by the 8 
groups. 
The estimated utility weight of leisure (𝛼) is lower than the calibrated value (0.47 under H0a), 
so the weight on consumption is about twice of that on leisure. The estimated share of labour 
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in the production function (𝛾) is very close to 1 (0.94 under H0a), but this is not surprising as 
our sample is highly concentrated in the labour intensive industries. Finally, the productivity 
(𝐴) is calculated to match the other parameters in the production function. 
4.1 The Auxiliary PSWP 
Based on the estimated structural parameters, many implications can be drawn with the help of 
the structural model. For example, the unobserved endogenous variables, such as consumption 
and leisure can also be calculated, but we will focus on the comparison between the observed 
and simulated wage premium in the public sector, which is the main theme of this study. 
The simulated wages under both hypotheses H0a and H0b are used to run the auxiliary regres-
sion (OLS or GOLS) in addition to running the same regression on the actual data (Figure 29). 
It is shown that the estimated auxiliary PSWP (i.e. the coefficient of the public sector dummy) 
based on the actual data lies right in the centre of the distribution of the PSWP estimates based 
on the simulated data of H0a.  
 
Figure 29 The PSWP of the Actual and Simulated Data (Single-Equation-Regression) 
The estimated structural parameters are also used to conduct the II test for other types of aux-
iliary regressions. For example, Figure 30 shows the estimated PSWP (due to differences in 
coefficients) using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method. Again, the hypothesis H0a is 
preferred over both H0b and H1. A similar conclusion is found for the type 3 (Figure 31) and 
type 4 (results omitted, because the coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio is not exactly a meas-
ure of the PSWP). If we only care about the model’s ability of matching the PSWP feature, 
then the neoclassical model can do a very good job no matter what auxiliary model is chosen, 
and there is no evidence for selection bias. This conclusion very robust in both II tests and II 
estimation. 
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Figure 30 The PSWP of the Actual and Simulated Data (Decomposition-Based) 
 
Figure 31 The PSWP of the Actual and Simulated Data (Matching-Based) 
4.2 The Structural PSWP 
We should distinguish between the auxiliary PSWP (or the PSWP estimated by the auxiliary 
models) and the structural PSWP (or the PSWP estimated by the structural model). The former 
is the coefficient of the auxiliary regression based on the reduced form, i.e. 𝛽 (an element of 
the auxiliary parameter vector 𝛝), while the latter is the coefficient of the regression based on 
the structural form, i.e. 𝜂 (an element of the structural elasticity vector 𝛈𝐷). 
As analysed earlier, the coefficient 𝜂 of the public sector dummy in the structural model can 
be interpreted as the elasticity of demand-side surplus with respect to working in the public 
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sector. Strictly speaking, it is not equivalent to 𝛽, which is the wage premium paid to the worker, 
in two senses. Firstly, 𝜂 is a welfare measure rather than a monetary measure. Secondly, 𝜂 is a 
measure from the firm’s (demand-side) perspective, so the sign should be reversed if we are to 
measure the net welfare gain from the worker’s (supply side) perspective. Nonetheless, in the 
neoclassical model, welfare is monetised and surplus is denominated by the same unit of wage, 
so the first difference is resolved. After reversing the sign of the estimated elasticity, the struc-
tural PSWP is estimated to be 0.0672 (or 6.72%) with a standard deviation of 0.0158, so it is 
highly significant.  
Model Technique PSWP 
E
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el
 Type 1 
Single-Equation-Regression 
OLS 5.27% 
Quantile Regression 5.31% 
Type 2 
Decomposition-Based 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 8.06% 
JMP Decomposition 8.27% 
Type 3 
Matching-Based 
Propensity Score Matching 7.17% 
Nearest Neighbour Matching 5.01% 
Type 4 
Multiple-Equation-Regression 
Heckman Selection Model 5.81% 
Treatment Effects Model 12.96% 
E
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n
o
m
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Neoclassical Model Indirect Inference 6.72% 
Table 6 Summary of the Estimated PSWP 
Table 6 summarises and contrasts the different measures of PSWP from both reduced-form 
econometric models (auxiliary models) and the microfounded economic model for the year 
2011. The economic model provides a quite robust estimate, lying in the middle of the estimates 
from various econometric models. 
4.3 The Post-Estimation Test 
The estimated parameters ?̂? are used to conduct the II test for all the five types of auxiliary 
models, and the test results are summarised in Table 7. 
For type 1, the resulting Wald statistics are halved, compared to the calibrated parameters (Ta-
ble 4), but both hypotheses are still strongly rejected. The same holds for another regression-
based method (type 4), because both type 1 and type 4 have 35 auxiliary parameters to be 
matched so it is very difficult to pass the powerful test. In contrast, under the estimated param-
eters, the model under the no selection bias hypotheses can pass the II test with auxiliary models 
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of types 2, 3 and 5. In particular, the GOLS (type 5) shows that the model is capable of match-
ing other (grouped) data features apart from PSWP. 
Auxiliary H0a H0b 
Regression Wald C-value P-value Wald C-value P-value 
Type 1: OLS 1909.45 49.60 0.00% 3113.23 49.82 0.00% 
Type 2: BOD 0.23 6.56 88.98% 57.29 6.59 0.00% 
Type 3: PSM 0.51 5.44 77.51% 17.59 6.74 0.02% 
Type 4: HSM 1881.93 50.19 0.00% 3082.42 49.58 0.00% 
Type 5: GOLS 4.69 15.07 79.02% 84.25 15.69 0.00% 
Table 7 II Tests of the Model under the Estimated Parameters 
It is also informative to see how the model performs in more details by spelling out which 
auxiliary parameters the model can and cannot match the data counterparts. The in-out tables 
for the five types of auxiliary regressions are reported in Table 8 and Table 9. 
It is obvious that the simulated data under the estimated parameters can match most aspects of 
the auxiliary regression, including all the education dummies, industry dummies, most occu-
pational dummies and especially the public sector wage premium measures in both single-
equation-regression (type 1) and multiple-equation-regression (type 4). The model is rejected 
overall mainly because of the discrepancies in matching some job attributes (demand side), 
such as industry and occupation dummies. If we only care about the model’s ability to match 
the estimated PSWP, then the model can actually pass the II test. This is confirmed by the type 
5 auxiliary model, with grouped regression coefficients. The model under no selection bias can 
match all the grouped data features, but the model under the pre-assumption of selection bias 
fail to match the return to work experience, occupation differences as well as the PSWP. 
Looking at the decomposition-based (type 2) and matching-based (type 3) auxiliary regressions 
in Table 9, which only focus on the PSWP, both Wald statistics calculated from the actual data 
lie within the critical values. Even if the parameters are estimated to minimise the gap between 
the simulated data and the actual data in terms of type 1 auxiliary regression, it also improves 
the capability of the estimated model to match the other types of auxiliary regressions. 
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Auxiliary Parameters Type 1 OLS Type 4 HSM Type 5 GOLS 
𝛝 H0a H0b H0a H0b H0a H0b 
intercept IN OUT IN IN IN OUT 
male OUT IN OUT IN   
white IN IN IN IN   
married IN IN IN IN   
homosexual IN IN IN IN IN IN 
age IN OUT IN OUT   
age2 IN OUT IN OUT   
migrant IN IN IN IN   
work experience IN OUT IN OUT 
IN OUT 
work experience2 IN OUT IN OUT 
low education IN IN IN IN   
GCSE IN IN IN IN   
A-level IN OUT IN IN IN IN 
higher education IN IN IN IN   
degree IN IN IN IN   
full time OUT OUT OUT OUT 
IN IN 
London IN IN IN IN 
energy & water IN IN IN IN   
manufacturing IN IN IN IN   
construction IN IN IN IN   
distribution IN IN IN IN 
IN IN 
transport IN IN IN IN 
banking IN IN IN IN   
public admin IN IN IN IN   
other services IN IN IN IN   
professional IN OUT OUT OUT   
technical IN OUT IN OUT   
administrative IN OUT IN OUT   
skilled trades OUT OUT IN OUT   
personal service IN OUT IN OUT IN OUT 
customer service IN OUT IN OUT   
processing IN OUT IN OUT   
elementary IN OUT IN OUT   
manual job IN IN IN IN   
public sector dummy IN OUT   IN OUT 
inverse Mill’s ratio   IN IN   
OVERALL OUT OUT OUT OUT IN OUT 
Table 8 The Details of Post-Estimation II Tests (Type 1, Type 4 and Type 5) 
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Auxiliary  
Parameters 
Type 2: Decomposition Type 3: Matching 
𝛝 H0a H0b 𝛝 H0a H0b 
Endow. Diff. 0.0862 IN IN    
Coeff. Diff. 0.0806 IN OUT    
ATT    0.2421 IN OUT 
ATU    -0.0120 IN OUT 
OVERALL  IN OUT  IN OUT 
Table 9 The Details of Post-Estimation II Tests (Type 2 and Type 3) 
5 The Power of Indirect Inference: A Monte Carlo Experiment 
The validity and reliability of the estimation/test results using II depend on its statistical power 
(the probability of correctly rejecting a false model). Le et al (2016) use Monte Carlo experi-
ments to evaluate the power of II in the context of macroeconomic DSGE models, concluding 
that II test has a greater power than the classical likelihood ratio test. This section will adopt a 
similar approach to investigating the power of II test in the context of microeconomic models. 
The Monte Carlo experiment is designed as follows. The estimated model with ?̂? is assumed 
to be the “true” model (the true data generating process), based on which we can simulate 1000 
datasets. To see the power of II test (its ability to spot out false models), the parameters are 
manipulated up and down in an alternate fashion to create some “falsified” models. The degrees 
of falsification are chosen to be 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% higher/lower than the estimated values. 
For each of the 1000 dataset, an II test is conducted based on the type 5 auxiliary model 
(GOLS)10. If the resulting p-value of a test is smaller than 5%, then we reject the model—the 
II test correctly spots out the false model and contributes to a higher power. Reversely, if the 
resulting p-value is greater than 5%, then we accept the model being true—the II test fails to 
spot out the false model and lowers the power. The proportion of the 1000 tests that reject the 
model being true is therefore the statistical power of II test. Figure 32 summarises the following: 
 Step 1: Simulation. Under the true model/parameters (?̂?), i.e. the “true” DGP, simulate 
𝑆 = 1000 sets of data.  
 Step 2: Falsification. Adjust the parameter (?̂?) by scaling the odd ones up by 𝑥 and the 
even ones down by −𝑥, where 𝑥 = 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%. 
 Step 3: Test. Apply the II test of the null hypothesis that “the model is true”. Note that 
the model here refers to the ones with falsified parameters. 
 Step 4: Conclusion. For all the 𝑆 simulations, we can obtain 𝑆 test statistics, critical 
values, p-values and test results (0 as true and 1 as false). The proportion of rejections, 
is just the simulated power. 
                                                          
10 As argued earlier, other auxiliary models are too heavily parameterised and it is very difficult to pass a model. 
GOLS provides the highest chance of accepting a model, so it is basically the lower bound of the power of II. 
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Figure 32 Illustration of the Monte Carlo Experiment 
A discussion of what ?̂? should include is due here. In Le et al (2016), their main results are 
based on different procedures applied to LR test and II test. To evaluate the power of LR test, 
they falsify the structural parameters while re-estimating the error parameters; but they falsify 
both structural and error parameters in evaluating indirect inference test. There are many argu-
able reasons for this difference in their study and they do check the robustness of their conclu-
sions (Table 8, p21), but this difference does raise the powers of indirect inference test by more 
falsified and more restricted parameters. Moreover, as shown in the results, for a much simpler 
microeconomic model, the error parameters have a much more weight than the structural pa-
rameters, so falsifying all parameters is neither fair to the structural parameters nor consistent 
with the II test procedure. 
In this paper, both methods are implemented to falsify the model, but the main conclusions are 
drawn based on the first: (i) only structural parameters (𝑠, 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝐴) are falsified but the error 
parameters (𝛈𝑆, 𝛈𝐷) are re-estimated for each test; (ii) all parameters are falsified without re-
estimating the error parameters. The resulting average p-values and simulated powers of the 
two methods are summarised in Table 10 and the distributions of p-values under the former 
method is shown in Figure 33 (the distributions of the latter method are simply clustered at 0). 
Falsification 
(i) Structural Parameters Only (ii) Structural & Error Parameters 
Mean P-Value Power Mean P-Value Power 
1% 59.03% 7.0% 0.1% 100% 
5% 20.87% 35.8% 0.0% 100% 
10% 5.92% 74.4% 0.0% 100% 
20% 1.35% 94.3% 0.0% 100% 
Table 10 The Simulated Powers of Indirect Inference Tests 
True Data True Model 
Simulated Data 
Simulated Data 
Simulated Data 
Simulated Data 
Simulated Data 
Falsified Model 
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Figure 33 The Distributions of P-Values of the Monte Carlo Experiments 
If we falsify all the parameters in the model, the indirect inference test has a too high power—
any small deviation will lead to a rejection. This finding is not a surprise, because by fiddling 
with both structural and error parameters, the falsified model can behave in a very different 
way from the true data simulated from the true model—remember that there are 4 structural 
parameters but 35 error parameters (8 groups).  
It is therefore more plausible to adopt the first method (only falsify the structural parameters 
and re-estimate the error parameters) in evaluating the power of indirect inference. The main 
argument is that this choice is consistent with the procedures used in indirect inference. In both 
test and estimation, we allow for re-estimation of the error parameters, such that the resulting 
innovations are IID. Without re-estimation of the error parameters, a small degree of deviation 
from the true parameters actually implies a huge degree of deviation from the true model, be-
cause of the high dimensionality of the error parameters11.  
According to Table 10 and Figure 33, we have seen that the power of indirect inference test is 
higher as the degree of falsification rises, and the p-values of accepting a false model is lower 
as the structural parameters are more false. Compared to the findings Le et al (2016), the pow-
ers at the same degrees of falsification are relatively lower in a microeconomic model. It is 
because a macroeconomic model is typically more heavily parameterised and more difficult to 
pass the test.  
                                                          
11 This is a smaller issue for a complicated DSGE model, where the error parameters have a relatively smaller 
dimension than the structural parameters. Therefore, the conclusion in Le et al (2016) is robust despite the un-
fairness in implementing the likelihood ratio and II tests. 
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6 A Level Playing Field? 
Both the econometric and economic models include the ad hoc public sector dummy to explain 
the wage data feature/behaviour—the sector dummy is explicitly part of the regressors in the 
econometric models, while it is implicitly specified in the error structure of the economic model. 
To some extent, it is not a huge surprise that the economic model can well explain the data 
behaviour summarised by auxiliary models with a similar specification. Moreover, though we 
managed to obtain a robust estimate of the PSWP by including the public sector dummy in 
both econometric and economic models, we don’t actually know what causes it. Is it fair to pay 
such a PSWP? Are the public sector workers on a level playing field? Different from the posi-
tive analysis (which is the focus of the thesis up to now), this section deals with the normative 
inquiry into the PSWP. 
This question can be asked in a slightly different but essentially equivalent way: can a pure 
neoclassical model with no ad hoc public sector dummy explain the data behaviour? In other 
words, if only meaningful economic parameters enter such an economic model and there is no 
“hold-all” public sector dummy in the error structure, can the model still pass the test? If it can, 
then the “pure” economic model is able to explain what is happening in the data behaviour 
where we found a “dummy” effect for public sector by all those econometric methods. Based 
on this argument, we re-test and re-estimate this “pure” economic model with no public sector 
dummy, while keeping the auxiliary models unchanged to summarise the data behaviour in-
cluding the PSWP. 
Firstly, we re-test this “pure” economic model under the previously estimated structural pa-
rameters (Table 5) to see the impact on the II test conclusions. Then, we re-estimate the “pure” 
model to see if the II estimates are significantly different from those based on the original 
model with the public sector dummy (the ad hoc specification). Finally, we re-test the re-esti-
mated “pure” model to obtain the maximum probabilities of passing the model.  
In Table 11, the two sets of tests based on the “pure” economic specification are contrasted 
with the ones under the original ad hoc specification. Under the previous estimates, the P-
values are inevitably smaller because those estimates are chosen to maximise the probabilities 
of passing the ad hoc specification. But the test conclusions are well maintained—under both 
specification, the null hypothesis H0a is still decisively accepted against the other alternatives. 
After re-estimation under the “pure” economic specification, the P-values increase marginally, 
and the re-estimated structural parameters are very close to those under the original specifica-
tion. It also suggests that the II procedures are fairly robust to different specifications. 
To summarise, we triumphantly find a pure neoclassical economic model without ad hoc public 
sector dummy and it can very well explain the wage data behaviour summarised by auxiliary 
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models (including the PSWP). That is to say, the estimated 6%-7% wage premium in the public 
sector is not a mystery. It comes about only because the people and jobs in the public sector 
require higher wages. The pure economics of the public sector and the workers creates this 
premium. There is no “bias” or “non-economic inequality” or “injustice due to political pres-
sure” going on. 
Specification ad hoc pure pure 
Parameters estimated estimated re-estimated 
 H0a H0b H0a H0b H0a H0b 
𝛼 0.2926 0.6788 0.2926 0.6788 0.3414 1.1308 
𝑠 5.4729 1.1673 5.4729 1.1673 6.4743 1.1712 
𝛾 0.9204 0.6029 0.9204 0.6029 0.9376 0.6042 
𝐴 29.50 27.22 29.50 27.22 31.12 27.11 
P-Values H0a H0b H0a H0b H0a H0b 
Type 1: OLS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Type 2: BOD 88.93% 0.00% 46.01% 0.00% 48.76% 0.00% 
Type 3: PSM 80.82% 0.10% 38.19% 0.02% 36.97% 0.02% 
Type 4: HSM 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Type 5: GOLS 79.04% 0.00% 59.50% 0.00% 60.50% 0.00% 
Table 11 The Indirect Inference Results of a Different Specification 
Notes: The estimation results and test results under the original specification (cells in shade) are respectively 
extracted from Table 5 and Table 7. 
7 Conclusion 
The neoclassical labour economic model with microfoundation is shown to be able to match 
most data features in the wage setting, especially in the wage premium summarised by the four 
popular types of methods in the microeconometric literature. Although the model cannot pass 
the test in the strict sense if the complete linear regression is used as the auxiliary model, it can 
successfully mimic the data feature if PSWP oriented auxiliary models or grouped regression 
coefficients are used. In particular, the propensity score matching leads to a high probability to 
pass the model, because of its robustness against mis-specification. This is logically coherent 
with the indirect inference test, which uses the auxiliary regression to provide a comparison 
basis rather than a serious model.  
With the help of a global optimisation algorithm (the genetic algorithm), the structural param-
eters are formally estimated using the grouped OLS as the auxiliary regression. The estimates 
are then used to simulate data and run other types of auxiliary regressions, resulting in a very 
robust conclusion that there is no selection bias in this particular dataset. If decomposition-
based or matching-based methods are used as auxiliary regressions, then the model can be 
verified as the true data generating process. Moreover, with a mild sacrifice of test power by 
grouping the regression coefficients, the model can also pass the test with a strong ability to 
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match both the PSWP feature and other data features such as return to education. The model-
consistent estimate of PSWP is 6.72%, in line with the evidence drawn from econometric mod-
els. A Monte Carlo experiment is also conducted to evaluate the statistical power of the II test, 
and it confirms that the II test and estimation procedures can provide a “formidable weapon in 
the armoury” of the users of micro models, as well as of “macro models” (Le et al, 2016).  
A normative analysis is conducted with the help of II applied to a pure economic model spec-
ification without the ad hoc public sector dummy in the error structure. It is argued that if such 
a pure neoclassical model can explain the data behaviour including the PSWP summarised by 
the auxiliary models, then the estimated PSWP is not caused by unfair political arrangements. 
The estimation and test results suggest that the observed wage premium in the public sector is 
economically justified and the workers in different sectors are on a level playing field compet-
ing for wages. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This thesis contributes to the literature on public sector wage premium by providing a robust 
estimate (6.5%) using the four types of microeconometric methods and a newly introduced 
indirect inference method. It is found that propensity score matching gives the most reasonable 
estimate thanks to its robustness to mis-specification. The estimate provided by decomposition-
based method shows that the observed wage differentials across sectors is mainly accounted 
for by the economic rent of working in the public sector, rather than the individual differences. 
The wage premium is greater for females and during economic downturns—evidence shows 
that there is a negative correlation between the estimated public sector wage premium and the 
macroeconomic business cycle (around -0.24).  
Built on the neoclassical labour economic theory, we derived a microfounded economic model, 
which is confronted with the individual-level wage data using indirect inference. All the four 
types of microeconometric methods are used as auxiliary models to summarise the data behav-
iour, in terms of which the economic model is tested. Under a reasonable calibration, the model 
can only pass the test if propensity score matching is used as the comparison criterion between 
the observed and simulated data features. A common feature of indirect inference and propen-
sity score matching is that both involve a procedure robust to mis-specification—the auxiliary 
model for indirect inference and the selection equation for propensity score matching. To max-
imise the probability of accepting the model, estimation is carried out using grouped OLS as 
the auxiliary model. The estimated model implies a 6.72% public sector wage premium, very 
close to the average of the microeconometric estimate. It is also straightforward to test selection 
bias using bundling bootstrap. For a specific dataset of 2011, the hypothesis of the neoclassical 
labour market model with no selection bias can be accepted with a very high probability. A 
Monte Carlo experiment based on the estimated model is conducted, which verifies the high 
statistical power of indirect inference method. Finally, with the help of indirect inference, it is 
shown that the estimated public sector wage premium is not likely to be a result of unfair po-
litical arrangement, and it can be consistent with the normal economic interactions in a com-
petitive labour market. 
Methodologically, this thesis is an innovative attempt to bridge the microeconomic and mac-
roeconomic research. As reviewed in the general introduction, the methodological convergence 
between the two sub-disciplines has begun in the 1980s, but most efforts are invested in build-
ing a microfoundation for macrodata analysis. This thesis, however, is trying to provide a mi-
crofoundation for microdata analysis, which is long ignored in the empirical literature. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 12 Descriptive Statistics of Wage (Aggregate) 
 Year N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
W
ee
k
ly
 W
a
g
e
 
2001 9191 423.63 312.03 220.80 364.16 554.45 
2002 11082 425.71 315.06 222.54 363.82 554.58 
2003 10655 428.54 322.73 218.04 362.57 563.74 
2004 9066 433.91 311.10 228.74 371.33 558.72 
2005 8129 446.75 327.08 234.36 381.21 578.82 
2006 9399 438.42 318.85 227.60 372.47 573.66 
2007 9633 442.44 318.42 237.31 376.01 577.24 
2008 9218 443.24 325.74 229.92 373.97 570.81 
2009 8640 449.90 330.57 233.61 380.87 577.77 
2010 8046 433.51 319.02 223.66 366.86 562.48 
2011 7732 419.33 309.07 212.30 349.78 543.32 
H
o
u
rl
y
 W
a
g
e 
2001 9191 11.76 7.72 6.86 9.69 14.28 
2002 11082 11.84 7.70 6.94 9.81 14.42 
2003 10655 12.05 7.93 6.96 9.85 14.71 
2004 9066 12.11 7.45 7.18 10.07 14.80 
2005 8129 12.55 7.96 7.35 10.39 15.35 
2006 9399 12.30 7.63 7.25 10.24 15.28 
2007 9633 12.40 7.74 7.29 10.26 15.33 
2008 9218 12.44 8.16 7.19 10.24 15.29 
2009 8640 12.73 8.12 7.42 10.55 15.56 
2010 8046 12.33 7.94 7.10 10.20 15.19 
2011 7732 11.96 7.58 6.90 9.78 14.97 
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Table 13 Descriptive Statistics of Pay Differentials by Gender 
  Overall Female Male 
  Private Public Private Public Private Public 
2001 11.59 12.18 9.62 11.19 13.58 14.33 
 9.40 10.61 7.76 9.56 11.14 12.95 
2002 11.65 12.29 9.79 11.35 13.55 14.50 
 9.45 10.76 7.96 9.85 11.18 13.01 
2003 11.85 12.52 9.91 11.56 13.81 14.79 
 9.43 10.96 7.85 10.02 11.34 13.43 
2004 11.80 12.78 10.00 11.89 13.59 14.78 
 9.57 11.07 8.16 10.34 11.25 13.05 
2005 12.24 13.23 10.38 12.43 14.21 15.28 
 9.75 11.86 8.25 10.94 11.69 13.78 
2006 12.00 12.91 10.18 12.02 13.89 14.99 
 9.69 11.30 8.24 10.57 11.42 13.21 
2007 12.15 12.93 10.20 12.24 14.08 14.62 
 9.66 11.60 8.25 10.79 11.44 13.48 
2008 12.24 12.86 10.43 12.06 13.98 14.75 
 9.69 11.30 8.12 10.55 11.38 13.11 
2009 12.46 13.29 10.60 12.48 14.27 15.24 
 9.90 11.96 8.44 11.08 11.51 14.00 
2010 12.02 12.99 10.26 12.40 13.69 14.36 
 9.59 11.44 8.28 10.87 10.97 13.08 
2011 11.62 12.71 9.72 12.02 13.44 14.33 
  9.10 11.21 7.79 10.40 10.81 13.02 
NB: The means are at the top of each cell, and medians are at the bottom. 
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Table 14 Descriptive Statistics of Working Hours by Gender 
  Overall Female Male 
  Private Public Private Public Private Public 
2001 35.99 32.95 30.35 29.78 41.68 39.83 
 38 37 35 33 40 38 
2002 35.77 32.85 30.32 30.1 41.33 39.26 
 38 37 35 33 40 38 
2003 35.52 32.08 29.92 29.1 41.19 39.13 
 38 36 35 32 40 38 
2004 35.75 32.96 30.48 30.25 40.95 39.06 
 38 36 35 35 40 38 
2005 35.43 32.74 30.21 30.37 40.93 38.86 
 38 37 35 35 40 38 
2006 35.53 32.57 30.49 30.11 40.73 38.25 
 38 36 35 34 40 38 
2007 35.69 32.7 30.41 30.46 40.95 38.17 
 38 37 35 35 40 38 
2008 35.85 32.82 30.98 30.32 40.55 38.7 
 38 37 35 35 40 38 
2009 35.38 32.54 30.36 30.31 40.26 37.98 
 38 37 35 35 40 38 
2010 35.15 32.48 30.21 30.22 39.84 37.8 
 38 37 35 35 40 38 
2011 34.87 32.4 29.86 29.94 39.64 38.17 
  38 36 35 32 40 38 
NB: The means are at the top of each cell, and medians are at the bottom. 
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Table 15 Description of the Variables in the Data 
Variable name Description 
gender Female = 0 and male = 1 
married Married (and living together) or cohabiting, heterosexual 
white_ghm White ethnic group using ethcen6 
ww Real weekly gross pay.   
ln_ww Natural log of real weekly gross pay.   
wh Real hourly gross pay.   
ln_wh Natural log of real hourly gross pay.   
child One or more dependent children in family aged 0-4. 
qualdgroup Highest qualification includes vocational qualifications 
 0 No qualifications 
 1 Other qualifications 
 2 GCSE A*-C or equivalent 
 3 GCE A Level or equivalent 
 4 Higher Education 
 5 Degree or equivalent 
age Age in years 
regiongroup Categorical variable for region of work (Standard Regions) 
 1 North  
 2 Yorks and Humberside 
 3 North West 
 4 East Midlands 
 5 West Midlands 
 6 East Anglia 
 7 London 
 8 South East 
 9 South West 
 10 Scotland 
 11 Wales 
 12 N. Ireland 
 13 Overseas 
ftime_ptime Works full time or part time (in main job) or not at all 
 0 Not working 
 1 Part Time Worker 
 2 Full Time Worker 
public_sector Works in public sector  
sic92_sector Industry sector using SIC92 (same as SIC 2003)- 9 categories 
 1 Agriculture, farming & fishing 
 2 Energy & water 
 3 Manufacturing 
 4 Construction 
 5 Distribution, hotels & restaurants 
 6 Transport & communication 
 7 Banking, finance & insurance 
 8 Public admin, education & health 
 9 Other services 
 10 Workplace outside UK 
90 
 
soc2000_1_digit Occupation groups, SOC2000, 9 groups 
  1 Managers and senior officials 
 2 Professional occupations 
 3 Associate professional and technical 
 4 Administrative and secretarial 
 5 Skilled trades occupations 
 6 Personal service occupations 
 7 Sales and customer service occupations 
 8 Process, plant and machine operatives 
 9 Elementary occupations 
year Year using calendar data. (Jan to Dec). Equals refwky 
manual Manual worker dummy 
ftime Works full time 
married_same Same sex couple, civil partners or cohabiting 
edage Age when completed continuous full time education 
workexp Work experience = age - edage 
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Selection Bias and Indirect Inference 
Selection bias occurs when there is an unobservable correlation between individual idiosyn-
cratic and unobservable errors (e) and observable characteristics (X) in a cross section. In direct 
inference it causes a bias in the estimator. Various suggestions exist for reducing or eliminating 
the bias, such as Hausman’s two-stage procedure. But of course there is no way of knowing 
whether in the end it has been effectively eliminated.  
In Indirect Inference (II) the auxiliary model equations, say as here a GOLS, are separate from 
the structural model. The auxiliary equations represent the data behaviour and therefore include 
the effect of any such unobservable correlation between e and X. The question then is what the 
true structural relationships are: do they include such a correlation or do they not? If they do 
we would like to estimate the ‘underlying’ effect of X on the agents after allowing for this 
correlation. If they do not, we would like to estimate it without any such correlation. We would 
also like to know whether there is indeed any such correlation in case we wish to do direct 
inference, because then we will know how much we can regard those results as bias-free. 
Under II we can carry out a test of whether the model with the correlation or without the cor-
relation is the true one. The way we do this is to set the model up in two different ways: 
1. without any such correlation where e is random; 
2. with such a correlation where e is related to X. 
In the first case we simulate the model with random e: viz. by bootstrapping e randomly. 
In the second we simulate the model allowing for e’s correlation for X by bootstrapping e and 
X together as a vector, so as to preserve any correlation observable in the sample. This sample 
correlation gives us our best estimate of the population correlation.  
In each case we can estimate the resulting model by II (i.e. by a minimum distance estimator 
where the distance is that between the auxiliary coefficients produced by the data and produced 
by the simulated data). Thus we get the best estimate of each model on the two assumptions 
about the correlation: zero or existent.  
Notice that the ‘underlying’ structural coefficients will in general be different estimates in the 
two cases, so that we can achieve our objective of estimating them whichever model is the true 
one. We may then test the two models against the data behaviour and choose the one that is not 
rejected or the one with the highest p-value (the model yielding the highest probability of gen-
erating the data). 
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This is a small sample method. We know the asymptotic properties of the estimator are con-
sistent and normal. The test needs to be evaluated in small samples and its asymptotic proper-
ties can be obtained numerically- Meenagh et al (2016) explain that the asymptotic power of 
the Wald test we use cannot be gauged analytically because it uses the distribution of the aux-
iliary parameters generated by a false structural model. 
We can assess the power of the test by Monte Carlo methods. Since this is a test where the true 
model can be either the one with the correlation or the one without we need to check its power 
under both possibilities. It is plain enough that when the true model is one of selection bias the 
power against the false model of no selection bias is increasing steadily as the selection bias 
gets larger.  
However, it is not so clear what the power is when the true model is of no selection bias: it 
might well seem that the test would have little power owing to the fact that any correlation 
found in the sample would occur by chance.  
One may raise a basic question about how one can be rejecting the selection-bias model when 
the no-selection-bias model is true. We must re-emphasise that the II process involves no OLS 
estimation; rather the structural model is bootstrapped under two different assumptions about 
its bias, in each case this assumption being treated as true. Effectively this basic question can 
be interpreted as that the two bootstrapping procedures should not be distinguishable when the 
true model (generating the data) has no bias. As a result the 'selection-bias' model should not 
be rejected more frequently than the true no-selection-bias model, i.e. only by 5% on a 5%-size 
test. In other words the II test has no power when the true model has no selection bias.  
It might well be thought that because there is in truth no such correlation that is what the sample 
bootstrapping must also reveal. However, in any given sample randomness will produce cor-
relations by chance; there are many characteristics in the X vector and so many possibilities 
for the error to be by chance related to one or more of these. We know that particularly if one 
has very large samples such patterns are more likely to be found: thus, if one constantly repeats 
experiments with the intent of finding a particular 'result' one is likely in the end to find one. 
This is similar to the idea of setting a bunch of monkeys to hit typewriters for weeks on end 
and to find 'some Shakespeare'.  
Thus one should note that there is a considerable difference between simulating a model under 
the restriction of a zero correlation (no selection bias bootstrap) and doing so under no re-
striction on the correlation (selection bias assumed); in the latter case any chance correlation 
found in the sample will be generalised in the simulations even though it is not the true corre-
lation. Thus if we test the model on the assumption it has selection bias, then we treat this 
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sample correlation as the best estimate of the true correlation: we then reestimate the model on 
this basis producing different underlying structural coefficient estimates. 
The only way to resolve this issue in the context of small sample procedures is via Monte Carlo 
experiment. We can also consider via such an experiment how the power changes as the sample 
size rises, to investigate the asymptotic properties of the test. 
In the following Monte Carlo experiment we test the power holding these underlying coeffi-
cient estimates constant at their assumed true values. This power calculation therefore under-
estimates the true power because changes in these coefficient estimates are excluded. Therefore, 
the Monte Carlo experiment gives the lower bound on the power. It is possible and desirable 
to go further and examine by Monte Carlo just how much power is enhanced by reestimation 
of the model: but this is highly computer-intensive and not possible in the time available now 
and so rather is left for future work. 
The Monte Carlo Experiment 
I have investigated the power issue raised by doing a Monte Carlo experiment, in which I have 
taken the situation as above: the 'true' model with no bias and the bootstrap test of the selection 
bias model using the bundled (or 'vector') bootstrap. I have taken the true model to be one with 
no selection bias and I have generated 1000 data samples from this model. I have then simulated 
both the no-selection-bias model and the selection-bias model as explained, by using the two 
different bootstrapping methods. I then test each model on the 1000 data samples. 
It turns out that there is power though not in a very small sample of only 500. Once the sample 
reaches the size of my sample here (6216), the rejection rate reaches 15% on a 5% test. Were 
I to have a sample nearly three times as large the rejection rate would reach nearly 100%. See 
the Table that follows. It is also plain that as the sample size rises even further the power 
reaches its maximum of 100%, suggesting that its power rises asymptotically.  
As noted above, the power here is at the lower bound because the structural model coefficients 
are held at their true value in the selection bias model. Were they to be re-estimated they would 
be moved to values away from the true ones which would raise the rejection rate. This is the 
reason that I find the selection bias model to be strongly rejected in my work.  
TRUE: no selection bias Proportion of Rejection of the Null 
Sample Size 
Small 
(N = 500) 
Original 
(N = 6,216) 
Big 
(N = 15,000) 
Asymptotic 
(N = 30,000) 
Null: H0a (no selection bias) 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Null: H0b (selection bias) 5% 14.5% 99.5% 100% 
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The II test distinguishes two structural models, one with a random error (no selection bias 
therefore), one where the error is correlated with people’s characteristics, X (creating selection 
bias). It checks the match of each model’s implied auxiliary model when simulated to the aux-
iliary model found in the data sample. The true model may either have or not have such an 
error correlation and this will be reflected in the auxiliary model coefficients. To simulate the 
model with such a correlation we bootstrap the error together with X since the sample correla-
tion is the best estimate of the population correlation. What we have shown here by Monte 
Carlo experiment is that even when the true model has a random error (no selection bias), the 
data will reject with greater than the size frequency the model where the error is assumed to be 
correlated with X. The reason is that since data samples typically generate such correlations by 
chance, only by ignoring them will the simulated model behave like the data. 
 
